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Deporting Terrorist Suspects with Assurances: Lessons 
from the United Kingdom 
BEN MIDDLETON 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over four years have passed since the Obama campaign responded 
enthusiastically to the famous Supreme Court decision in Boumediene v 
Bush.1 Viewed from across the Atlantic, one could be forgiven for thinking 
that an era of change was forthcoming and that the ³legal black hole´2 of 
the Guantánamo Bay detention camp would finally succumb to a new 
order of constitutionalism.  First impressions were encouraging; upon 
reaching office, the Obama administration ordered a review of all detainees 
held at the camp and pledged to secure its closure within one year.3  
Despite this initial commitment, the subsequent and continued failure to 
VHFXUH*XDQWiQDPR¶VFORVXUH4 has been repeatedly castigated by the press, 
academia and non-government organizations (NGO) alike.5 
 
                                                                                                                          

 Senior Lecturer in law, University of Sunderland, United Kingdom, email: 
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usual caveat applies. 
1Boumediene v Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732±  KROGLQJ WKDW ³DOLHQVGHVLJQDWHG DV HQHP\
FRPEDWDQWVKDYHWKHKDEHDVFRUSXVSULYLOHJH´DQGWKDWWKH'HWDLQHH7UHDWPHQW$ct of 2005, which 
SURYLGHGWKHSURFHGXUHWRUHYLHZGHWDLQHHV¶VWDWXVHVZDV³QRWDQDGHTXDWHDQGHIIHFWLYHVXEVWLWXWHIRU
KDEHDV FRUSXV´ See Sam Graham-Felsen, 2EDPD 6WDWHPHQW RQ 7RGD\¶V 6XSUHPH &RXUW 'HFLVLRQ, 
BARACK OBAMA (June 12, 2008, 4:16 PM), http://my.barackobama.com/page/community/post/ 
samgrahamfelsen/gG5Gz5. 
2 Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT¶L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 1 (2004). 
3 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3 C.F.R. 203, 205 (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13,493, 3 C.F.R. 
207, 207±08 (Jan. 22, 2009).  
4 See Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, *XDQWDQDPR %D\ :K\ 2EDPD +DVQ¶W )XOILOOHG +LV
Promise to Close the Facility, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
guantanamo-bay-how-the-white-house-lost-the-fight-to-close-it/2011/04/14/AFtxR5XE_story.html. 
5 The Washington Post opined that the volte-face ³DOOEXWFHPHQWV*XDQWDQDPR%D\
VFRQWLQXLQJ
UROH LQ 86 FRXQWHUWHUURULVP SROLF\´ 3HWHU )LQQ 	 $QQH ( .RUQEOXW Obama Creates Indefinite 
Detention System for Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST (Mar. 8,  2011),  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/obama-creates-indefinite-detention-system-for-prisoners-at-
Guantánamo-bay/2011/03/07/ABbhqzO_story.html. The New York Times DFNQRZOHGJHG WKH³IDLOXUH´
of the administration.  Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama Clears Way for Guantánamo Trials, N.Y.. 
TIMES (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/world/americas/08guantanamo. 
html?ref=militarycommission. As to NGO opposition, see, e,g,, USA: Digging a Deeper Hole: 
Administration and Congress Entrenching Human Rights Failure on Guantánamo Detentions,  
AMNESTY INT¶L 1, 5 (Mar. 11 2011), http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/usa-digging-a-
deeper-hole-administration-and-congress-entrenching-human-rights-failure-on-guantanamo 
UHIHUHQFLQJWKHFRQWLQXHG³IDLOXUH´ 
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The inability to find acceptable ways to deal with terrorist suspects in 
the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to substantiate a criminal 
conviction, perhaps even in military tribunals,6 is a problem shared by 
other Western democracies7 that are partners in the War on Terror, and the 
dichotomy between Anglo and American approaches has weakened over 
recent years.8  The British and American governments appear committed to 
reining in some of the emergency terrorism powers sought by their 
predecessors;9 both governments are committed to well-defined counter-
terrorism strategies including executive ³ULVN-PDQDJHPHQW´ of terrorist 
suspects.10  Transatlantic counter-terrorism strategies place at their heart a 
continuing emphasis on securing the removal of high-risk terrorists from 
home soil.11  In the United Kingdom, terrorist suspects have been detained 
without charges12 RUVXEMHFWHGWRFRQWURYHUVLDO³control orders´13  Foreign 
                                                                                                                          
6
 Obama has stated that a five pronged strategy is required: to prosecute in the federal courts; to 
use Military Commissions through the introduction of a new series of procedures and safeguards; to 
release where mandated by the courts; to transfer to another country; and to use ³SURORQJHGGHWHQWLRQ
subject to regular review and safeguards of individuals who could not be so treated. Press Release, 
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09.  In the 
United Kingdom, comparable issues have been identified by the Government.  SECRETARY OF STATE 
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, CONTEST: THE UNITED KINGDOM¶S STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING 
TERRORISM, 2011 Cm. 8123, at¶ 4.25±.27 (U.K.).  
7 As a result, assurances are now routinely sought by a number of States, including the United 
Kingom, United States, Canada, and various European countries. See, e.g., Still at Risk: Diplomatic 
Assurances No Safeguard Against Torture, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Apr. 2005 Vol. 17, No. 4(D) at 1, 28, 
47, 57, 67, 72, 76, 79. 
8
 %\WKLV³GLFKRWRP\´,UHIHUWRWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHSXUVXLWRI*XDQWiQDPR%D\GHWHQWLRQ
post-LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQFRPSDULVRQZLWKWKHV\VWHPRI³FRQWURORUGHUV´WKDWZHUHHVWDEOLVKHG
in the United Kingdom, and also the initial attempts to circumvent constitutional guarantees for 
terrorists in the United States in comparison to the (limited) due process that was established in the 
8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶VV\VWHPRIGHWHQWLRQ 
9
 Compare Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 3, at 203±05 (discussing ObamD¶VLQLWLDOVXSSRUW
for the closure of Guantánamo Bay) with Press Release, Home Secretary, Rapid Review of Counter-
Terrorism Powers (Jul. 13, 2010), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/press-releases/counter-
powers (In the United Kingdom, the Counter-Terrorism Review 2011 was announced on July 13, 2010 
WRDPHQGRU³UROOEDFN´OHJLVODWLRQZKHUHQHHGHGLQRUGHUWR³UHVWRUH WKHEDODQFHRIFLYLOOLEHUWLHV´
The review had been commissioned by the incoming coalition government, elements of which had 
long-opposed aspects of the counter-terrorism regime operated by the previous Labour government. 
/LEHUDO 'HPRFUDWV KDG SOHGJHG WR ³>V@FUDS FRQWURO RUGHUV ZKLFK FDQ XVH VHFUHW HYLGHQFH WR SODFH
SHRSOHXQGHUKRXVHDUUHVW´DQGDOVR³UHGXFHWKHPD[LPXPSHULRGRIpre-FKDUJHGHWHQWLRQWRGD\V´
Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010, Liberal Democrats 94±95 (2010), http://network.libdems.org.uk/ 
manifesto2010/libdem_manifesto_2010.pdf. The review was limited to consideration of six core issues: 
the use of control orders; the use of stop and search powers; the detention of terrorist suspects before 
FKDUJHH[WHQGLQJWKHXVHRI':$DQGPHDVXUHV WR³GHDOZLWKRUJDQL]DWLRQVWKDWSURPRWHKDWUHGRU
YLROHQFH´ SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, REVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORISM 
AND SECURITY POWERS: REVIEW FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 2011 Cm. 8004 at 4 (U.K.). 
10
 See Clive Walker, Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of Constitutionalism, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1400 (2007). 
11
 In the United Kingdom, CONTEST places the DWA regime at its heart. See SECRETARY OF 
STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, supra note 6, ¶¶ 4.30±.31. In the United States, the National 
Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011, alludes to similar principles vis-à-vis the relationship with 
other States. Press Release, Barack Obama, supra note 6. 
12
 The powers were contained in Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 
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national terrorist suspects continue to be earmarked for deportation from 
the jurisdiction,14 and detention measures are routinely deployed while 
removal is secured.15 
With the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan and the recent ten-
\HDUDQQLYHUVDU\RIWKHZRUOG¶VJD]HUHPDLQVIL[HGRQ*XDQWiQDPR16 
Indefinite terrorist detention in the United States may have a limited shelf-
life, just as it did in Great Britain, but the Obama administration appears to 
be advocating long-term ³prolonged detention´ for a number of 
detainees.17  Notwithstanding sustained congressional opposition to the 
appropriation of funds needed to secure the closure of the camp,18 there has 
                                                                                                                          
ZKLFK SURYLGHG IRU D SURFHVV RI ³FHUWLILFDWLRQ´ E\ WKH +RPH 6HFUHWDU\ WKDW D IRUHLJQ QDWLRQDO ZDV
reasonably suspected to be a terrorist. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24, §§ 21±23 
(Eng.). In A & Others v. SSHD, [2004] UKHL 50±56 (appeal taken from [2004] EWCA CIV 1502), the 
House of Lords declared that the Part IV powers were incompatible with Articles 5 and 15 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, pursuant to s. 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The detention 
powers were subsequently repealed by Parliament. See also Mark Elliott, 8QLWHG.LQJGRP7KH³:DU
RQ7HUURU´8.-Style±The Detention and Deportation of Suspected Terrorists, 8 INT¶L J. CONST. L. 
131, 132 (2010). 
13
 Control orders were issued pursuant to s. 2 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and were 
preventive orders that required specified individuals to comply with obligations imposed for purposes 
connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.  For a detailed discussion of 
the regime. See Walker, supra note 10 DW  $ QHZ V\VWHP RI ³Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures" (TPIMS) has recently been implemented by the UK Parliament, which are in 
effect a watered-down set of compromise measures that have replaced the maligned control order 
regime. For a discussion of the measures in their proposed form, see Ben Middleton, Rebalancing, 
Reviewing or Rebranding the Treatment of Terrorist Suspects: The Counter-Terrorism Review 2011,   
75 J. CRIM. L. 225, 227 (2011). 
14
 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, supra note 6, ¶ 4.30.   
15
 Immigration Act 1971, c. 77, § 5, sch. 3 (Eng.). Detention pending deportation is dependent on 
the proceedings making satisfactory progress, and detention cannot be continued when proceedings 
have been discontinued. (The requisite UK authority is R v. Governor of Durham Prison ex parte 
Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704, 704; the U.S. counterpart would be Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 
386 (2004)). 
16
 See the comments of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1DYL3LOOD\³,XUJHWKH
US Congress to take steps to enable the US Administration to close the Guantanamo Bay detention 
centre ± as it stated it wished to do ± LQ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU
international human rights law, and in so doing, to fully respect the principle of non-refoulement, under 
which no one should be sent back WRDFRXQWU\ZKHUHWKH\PD\IDFHWRUWXUH´3UHVV5HOHDVH2IILFHRI
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, Pillay Deeply Disturbed by US failure to Close 
Guantanamo Prison, United Nations (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11772&LangID=E. In the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister has 
LQGLFDWHGWKDW³WKH)RUHLJQ6HFUHWDU\LVZRUNLQJYHU\KDUGZLWKWKH8QLWHG6Wates to try to secure the 
LVVXHDQGEULQJWKLVFKDSWHUWRDFORVH´-DQPARL. DEB., H.C. (2012) 176 (U.K.). 
17
 The Belmarsh litigation ultimately led to the repeal of the detention provisions in the United 
Kingdom. Middleton, supra note 13, at 233 n.52. Note that in the United States, there has been a 
UHQHZHGHPSKDVLVRQ ³SURORQJHGGHWHQWLRQ´SROLFLHV RXWVLGHRI *XDQWiQDPR %D\ DVSDUW RI D QHZ
direction in the Obama-inspired terrorism policy. See Press Release, Obama, supra note 6. 
18
 Congress remained opposed to the appropriation of funds to Guantánamo for trial or transfer 
into the US, and blocked such funds in a variety of legislative measures throughout 2009, 2010 and 
2011. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 552, 123 
Stat. 2142, 2177-79 (2009); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111- 
84, § 1041, 123 Stat. 2190, 2454-55 (2009); Interior Department and Further Continuing 
Appropriations, Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-88, § 428, 123 Stat. 2904, 2962 (2009); H.R. 6523, 
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been a steady decline in the numbers of inmates,19 and a variety of 
countries have now committed to allowing the repatriation of a number of 
purportedly high-risk individuals onto their home soil.20  
,Q RUGHU WR UHDOL]H 2EDPD¶V SURPLVH to bring about the closure of 
Guantánamo, a renewed fervor in international co-operation is required.21 
It is axiomatic that States must take responsibility for dealing with 
terrorists through conventional criminal justice procedures within their 
borders; States must also work with other countries to deport individuals 
who cannot be prosecuted.22  Where the successful prosecution of terrorists 
is precluded for operational, evidential, or security imperatives,23 foreign 
terrorists (or terrorist suspects) should be removed to their countries of 
origin in a constitutional manner that is consistent with the rule of law.24 
                                                                                                                          
111th Cong. § 1032, which is commonly known as the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2011. In December 2011, Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. Res. 1540, 112th Cong. §§1021±22, which controversially affirms the broad 
executive powers of indefinite detention of terrorist suspects, and does not exclude U.S. citizens from 
the scope of the powers. 
19 GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, Final Rep. 1 (2010) [hereinafter GUANTÁNAMO REVIEW] 
is the review by the Obama administration of the detainees at Guantánamo which held that 126 
detainees had been approved for transfer to a third country (of whom forty-four had been transferred as 
of January 2010); Forty-four individuals were to be prosecuted either in the federal courts or by 
military commission; forty-eight detainees were considered too dangerous for release but not feasible 
for prosecution, and therefore would continue to be detained indefinitely; and thirty detainees from 
Yemen would be eligible for ³conditional´ detention pending repatriation to Yemen. Id. at ii. See also 
David Bowker & David Kaye, Guantánamo by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/10/opinion/10kayeintro.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print. In March 
2011, Obama signed a new Executive Order that effectively put an end to hyperbole around imminent 
Guantánamo closure. Exec. Order No. 13,567, 3 C.F.R. 227 (2011).  The order implemented a regime 
of indefinite detention, together with review mechanisms, for individuals who could not be prosecuted. 
Id. at §§ 2±3.  The administration also indicated that it would be restarting trial by military commission 
at Guantánamo. Press Release: Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantánamo and Detainee Policy, White 
House, (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-actions-
guant-namo-and-detainee-policy. 
20
 Detainees have inter alia been accepted by Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kuwait, Libya, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia 
(Somaliland), Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, 
the United Kingdom, and Yemen. GUANTÁNAMO REVIEW, supra note 19, at 1. 
21
 $V LV QRWHG LQ WKH  86 &RXQWHUWHUURULVP 6WUDWHJ\ LW LV QHFHVVDU\ WR ³MRLQ ZLWK NH\
SDUWQHUVDQGDOOLHVWRVKDUHWKHEXUGHQVRIFRPPRQVHFXULW\´DQGZRUNLQJZLWKRWKHUFRXQWULHVWKDWGR
not share similar commitments to human rights and responsible governance is similarly crucial. WHITE 
HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 6±7 (2011). 
22
 Id. at 5±6, 9. 
23
 There  may  not  be  sufficient  evidence  regarding  alleged  involvement  in  terrorism-related  
activity  to  charge  an  individual  with  an  individual  crime;  this  issue  may  be  exacerbated  by  the  
need  for  law  enforcement  agencies  to  intervene  at  an  early stage in a terrorism investigation in 
order to protect the public. Some  or  all  of  the  available  evidence  may  be  inadmissible  in  court.  
It  is  also  possible  that  prosecution  may  divulge  sensitive  intelligence  gathering  techniques  or  
threaten national security. For the U.K. position in relation to these risks, see SEC¶Y OF STATE FOR THE 
HOME DEP¶T, supra note 9, at 37. 
24
 An evaluation of the detail of the arguments around the preservation of the rule of law is 
beyond the ambit of this article, but an apt definition was provided by the Secretary General of the 
United Nations: ³>WKH UXOH RI ODZ UHTXLUHV@ PHDVXUHV WR HQVXUH DGKHUHQFH WR WKH SULQFLSOHV RI
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In light of the considerable emphasis placed on removal strategies for 
terrorism suspects by the U.K. and U.S. governments, an assessment of the 
use of terrorist deportation, and the ensuing juridical and legislative checks 
that operate, is timely.  Removal of a terrorist suspect from the jurisdiction 
may be precluded by a variety of factors.25  Perhaps the overarching 
prohibition stems from the obligation not to return an individual where 
there is a risk of torture (the non-refoulement principle).26  States have 
resorted to assurances (diplomatic promises) through which they hope to 
reduce this risk to acceptable levels, in order to remove a suspect from 
their soil in a constitutional and rights-compliant manner.27  The use of a 
deportation with assurances (DWA) regime has attracted multifarious 
criticisms.28 
The central premise of this article is that no compelling justification 
precludes the formulation of a successful DWA regime.  Part II explores 
the background of removal procedures in the United Kingdom and 
contextualizes the bars to terrorist removal through an analysis of the most 
recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  
Part III contrasts the approach taken by the US government and suggests 
that the comparative lack of judicial oversight is a cause for concern.  
In Part IV, the article advances its central argument through a 
systematic discussion of the various and overlapping criticisms that have 
beset assurance regimes.  Each of the criticisms may be addressed by 
                                                                                                                          
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the 
law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness 
DQG SURFHGXUDO DQG OHJDO WUDQVSDUHQF\´ United Nations Rule of Law: What is the rule of law?,   
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=3 (last visited Jan. 16, 2011). See  e.g., TOM BINGHAM, 
THE RULE OF  LAW 3±4, 133 (2010); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 93 L.Q. REV. 195, 
195±96 (1997). 
25
 In the United Kingdom, the common bars will be based on Human Rights arguments under the 
ECHR, most notably Articles 2, 3 and 6. It is axiomatic that UK nationals cannot be deported. Section 
40(5)(b) British Nationality Act 1981 provides that the Home Secretary cannot deprive an individual of 
their British Nationality if it would render him stateless. See also Convention Relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons, art. 2±3, 6, U.N. DOC. ECOSOC RES/526 (Sep. 23, 1954). 
26
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 113 (1984) (hereinafter CAT).  CAT provides: 
³1R6WDWH3DUW\VKDOOH[SHOUHWXUQ³UHIRXOHU´RUH[WUDGLWHDSHUVRQWRDQRWKHU6WDWHZKHUH
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 
   2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities 
shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the 
SWDWHFRQFHUQHGRIDFRQVLVWHQWSDWWHUQRIJURVVIODJUDQWRUPDVVYLRODWLRQVRIKXPDQULJKWV´ 
27
 See Kate Jones, Deportation with Assurances: Addressing Key Criticisms 57 INT¶L & COMP. 
L.Q. 184 (2008); Martin Jones, Lies, Damned Lies and Diplomatic Assurances: The Misuse of 
Diplomatic Assurances in Removal Proceedings, 8 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 9, 10 (2006). 
28
 These criticisms are varied and complex but are summarized thus: assurances undermine the jus 
cogens status of the prohibition of torture; assurances are ineffective, unreliable and unenforceable; 
States may ignore assurances or break them with impunity; assurances are given, received and 
PRQLWRUHGLQUHODWLYHVHFUHF\DQGLWLVLQQRSDUW\¶VLQWHUHVWWRUHSRUWDEUHDFKDQGKHQFHPRQLWRULQJLV
ineffective. These criticisms are examined in Part IV below. 
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constructing a DWA framework on the tripartite foundations of 
justiciability (in terms of whether an appropriate tribunal exercises 
oversight of the use of such assurances), a doctrine of compliance 
(ensuring that assurances are not reneged upon, even where they are not 
legally enforceable), and a requirement for appropriate independent 
monitoring.  Part V concludes by suggesting that these three criteria should 
form the basis of a future DWA rubric and must be established in law in 
order to provide constitutional legitimacy and enhanced oversight.  In light 
of the international nature of the required dialogue, several of the offered 
conclusions would inform changes to the counter-terrorism arsenal of other 
allies in the War on Terror.  
II. REMOVAL OF TERRORISTS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The deportation regime in place in the United Kingdom has been 
described as a ³sprawling corpus´29 of ³imperfect´30 laws of ³daunting 
complexity´31  Non-British foreign nationals from outside the EU are 
subject to immigration control.32  Leave to enter or remain in the United 
Kingdom may be given, but can be revoked at any time, even if a non-
citizen has indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom, if the Home 
Secretary considers it ³conducive to the public good´33  These powers are 
used frequently in terrorism-related cases.34 Indeed, deportation and 
exclusion form part of the Pursue35 VWUDQG RI WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V FRXQWHU-
terrorism strategy36 for one important reason: deportation requires a much 
lower standard of proof than is required by a criminal conviction.  If the 
Home Secretary wishes to rely on a particular act as evidence to deport, the 
                                                                                                                          
29
 Alison Harvey, Legislative Comment: The Borders, Citizenship and the Immigration Act 2009, 
24 J. IMMIGR., ASYLUM & NAT¶LITY L. 118 (2009). 
30$:%5$'/(<	.'(:,1*&2167,787,21$/$1'$'0,1,675$7,9(/$: 
31
 David McClean, Immigration and Asylum in the United Kingdom, 12 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 
152, 152 (2010).  
32
 Immigration Act 1971, 1971, c. 77, § 3 (U.K.). Note that aliens who are nationals of EU 
countries benefit from the right to freedom of movement within the EU and do not require leave to do 
so.  Immigration Act 1988, 1988, c. 14, § 7 (U.K.). 
33,PPLJUDWLRQ$FWF8. 
34)RUH[DPSOH³>E@HWZHHQ-XO\DQGWKHHQGRISHRSOHKDYHEHHQH[FOXGHGIURP
WKH8.RQQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\JURXQGV«´+20('(3$570(1738568(35(9(173527(&735(3$5(
7+(81,7('.,1*'20¶6675$7(*<)25&2817(5,1*,17(51$7,21$/7(5525,60&P
 
35
 ³7KHSXUSRVHRIPursue is to stop terrorist attacks in [the United Kingdom@«DQGDJDLQVWRXU
interest overseas. This means detecting and investigating threats at the earliest possible stage, 
disrupting terrorist activity before it can endanger the public and, wherever possible, prosecuting those 
UHVSRQVLEOH´CONTEST, supra note 6, at ¶ 1.16.  
36
 Although CONTEST stresses that these executive powers affect only a very small number of 
individuals, HOME DEPARTMENT, supra note 34, at 60, this does not detract from the fact that these 
alternative treatment strategies are in use and have proven problematic. By way of statistics, 
CONTEST provides that some twenty individuals were subject to deportation or had deportation 
appeals pending in 2008. Id. at 65. 
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civil standard of proof applies.37  The House of Lords has affirmed that it is 
the function of the Home Secretary to carry out an assessment of risk 
posed by the individual and to determine whether their presence in the 
United Kingdom is not ³conducive to the public good´38  Their Lordships 
have cogently stated the position: 
 
[The Secretary of State] is entitled to have regard to the 
precautionary and preventative principles rather than to wait 
until directly harmful activities have taken place, the 
individual in the meantime remaining in this country. In 
doing so he is not merely finding facts but forming an 
executive judgement or assessment. There must be material 
on which proportionately and reasonably he can conclude 
that there is a real possibility of activities harmful to national 
security but he does not have to be satisfied, nor on appeal to 
show, that all the material before him is proved, and his 
FRQFOXVLRQ LV MXVWLILHG WR D ³KLJK FLYLO GHJUHH RI
SUREDELOLW\´39 
 
These broadly conferred deportation powers are analogous, though not 
identical, to those formerly exercised in the United Kingdom under the 
control order regime, and similar deference to the security-based 
assessment of the Home Secretary appears in the new Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures.40  When the decision to make a 
deportation order is made, the subject of the order can be detained under 
the authority of the Secretary of State.41  Detention pending deportation is 
an essential feature of the risk-management of terrorist suspects.42 The 
6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHWKUHDWSRVHG by a terrorist 
suspect, and a decision to deport based on whether their presence is not 
conducive to the public good, is largely objective in nature.  The courts 
                                                                                                                          
376HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HSDUWPHQWY5HKPDQ>@8.+/>@ 
38
 Id.  
39
 Id.  
40
 The similarities relate to the possibility for secret intelligence to inform the process and the fact 
that the decision stems from a simple executive determination (though note that in the case of TPIMS, 
court authorization (save as for urgent cases) is also required under section. Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Act 2011, 2011, c. 23, § 3(5). 
41,PPLJUDWLRQ$FWVXSUDQRWH 
42
 Following Regina v. Governor of Durham Prison ex parte. Singh, [1984] 1 WLR 704, 706,  an 
individual can be detained only for a period that is reasonably necessary, and the Secretary of State 
should not seek to detain him if it becomes apparent that deportation cannot take place within a 
reasonable period. Similarly, the Secretary of State must act with reasonable diligence and expedition 
WR HIIHFW UHPRYDO 'HSRUWDWLRQ SURFHHGLQJV PXVW WKHUHIRUH EH ³LQ SURJUHVV´ EHIRUH GHWHQWLRQ LV D
possibility. See also Chahal v. United Kingdom (No. 22), 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1862.                                                                                          
 136 CONNECTICUT PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:1 
 
will reach their own assessment,43 but the judiciary has consistently leaned 
towards affording the executive a considerable degree of deference.44  
Section 3(2) Immigration Act 1972 gives the Home Secretary the 
power to make Immigration Rules.45  These powers must be exercised in 
accordance with the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 
1998), which gives further effect in domestic law to the U.K.¶VREOLJDWLRQV
under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR).46  Immigration control decisions are generally subject 
to an appeals process heard by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal.47 
For terrorist suspects, such appeals are often lodged against decisions to 
withdraw leave to remain in the United Kingdom or refusal to revoke a 
deportation order and are heard by the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC),48 which can conduct closed hearings when necessary 
in order to receive secret information.  Deportees are represented by 
Special Advocates (security-cleared counsel) in this situation.49 
Deportation may represent an attractive option to governments wishing 
to protect their populous but it is not without its limitations; the need for 
States to implement measures to deal with ³home-grown´ terrorists 
remains.50  Additionally, the deportation of terrorist suspects is not simply 
an Anglo-American, or even American-European, phenomenon.51  Other 
                                                                                                                          
43
 1.HQ\DY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HSDUWPHQW>@(:&$&LY>@DSSHDO
taken from Immigration Appeal Tribunal). The Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 
established SIAC, a superior court of record, to hear such national security appeals. 
44
 ³>7KH +RPH 6HFUHWDU\@ LV XQGRXEWHGO\ LQ WKH EHVW SRVLWLRQ WR MXGJH ZKDW QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\
requires even if his decision is open to review. The assessment of what is needed in the light of 
FKDQJLQJ FLUFXPVWDQFHV LV SULPDULO\ IRU KLP´ 6HF¶\ RI 6WDWH IRU WKH +RPH 'HSDUWPHQW Y 5HKPDQ
>@8.+/>@. 
45
 ,PPLJUDWLRQ$FWVXSUDQRWH 
46$SURYLVLRQFRQWDLQHGLQ6WDWHPHQWRI&KDQJHVLQ,PPLJUDWLRQ5XOHV+&%LOO>@SW
 (QJ WKDW LV ODUJHO\ UHQGHUHG VXSHUIOXRXV E\ WKH +XPDQ 5LJKWV$FW  F   E
8. 
47$V\OXP	,PPLJUDWLRQ7UHDWPHQWRI&ODLPDQWV(WF$FWF8. 
48
 The jurisdiction and task of the Commission is to determine an appeal against a decision to 
make a deportation order under section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, chapter 77 when the 
Secretary of State has issued a certificate under section 97 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum 
Act 2002. See Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act, 1997, § 2(1)(a) (U.K.).  See also 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, 2002, § 82(2)(j) (U.K.). 
49
 An analysis of the role and function of Special Advocates lies outside the ambit of this article, 
and the European Court of Human Rights has held that deportation is a public law issue and not 
determinative of any civil right.  Maaouia v. France, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 27, 
2012). 
50
 Four British terrorists were behind the 2005 bombings on the London transport network. While 
these terrorists had links to Al-Qaida, they were British citizens, with British passports. This issue was 
widely reported in the media and in CONTEST. See Philip Johnston, Home-Grown Extremists are 
Biggest Threat to Life and Liberty, TELEGRAPH (London), July 7, 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
news/uknews/1523282/Home-grown-extremists-are-the-biggest-threat-to-life-and-liberty.html.  British 
Nationality Act 1981, supra note 25, § 40(4) (stating the Home Secretary cannot deprive an individual 
of their British Nationality if it would render him stateless). See also Convention Relating to the Status 
of Stateless Persons, supra note 25, art. 28. 
51
 See +20('(3$570(17VXSUDQRWHDW527 PARL. DEB., H.C. (2011) 465 (U.K.). 
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countries that do not share Western ideologies, or a commitment to 
International Human Rights¶ guarantees, are often implicated in these 
arrangements.52  In these circumstances, a complex set of agreements may 
be necessary to mitigate the risk of a suspect being subject to a human 
rights violation upon their return. 
A deportee who is desperate to avoid being returned to his country of 
origin may claim various human rights breaches; purported evidence of 
threats of lengthy periods of incommunicado detention, flagrantly unfair 
trials, interferences with private and family life, and interferences with 
religious convictions are routinely deployed in U.K. challenges to removal 
proceedings.53  These provisions, however, are not absolute in nature and 
may be easily circumvented.54  Articles 8 and 9 ECHR are qualified rights; 
such qualifications ensure that the state may have little difficulty in 
discharging these burdens in order to deport.55  Nonetheless, the ECtHR in 
Soering has recognized the ³exceptional´ possibility that deportation may 
be precluded by fair trial requirements under Article 6 ECHR. 56  A ³real 
risk´ of treatment that amounts to a ³flagrant denial´ of Article 6 is needed 
in order to constitute a breach.57  This has been subsequently held to 
amount to a ³complete denial or nullification´ of the right.58  The same test 
applies to the right to liberty and security under Article 5 ECHR.59  
                                                                                                                          
52 7KH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP IRU H[DPSOH KDV VRXJKW RU LV VHHNLQJ DUUDQJHPHQWV ZLWK VHYHUDO
FRXQWULHVLQFOXGLQJ$OJHULD(WKLRSLD-RUGDQ/HEDQRQ/LE\DDQG3DNLVWDQ6HH+20('(3$570(17
VXSUDQRWHDW3$5/'(%+&8. 
53 6HH HJ - Y 6HF¶\ RI 6WDWH IRU WKH +RPH 'HS¶W >@ 8.6,$& >@->@
GLVFXVVLQJ WKH OLEHUW\ DQG IDLU WULDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV 2WKPDQ $EX 4DWDGD Y 8QLWHG .LQJGRP
+8'2&KWWSZZZHFKUFRHLQWODVWYLVLWHG1RY>KHUHDIWHU4DWDGD@ 
54
 It is clear that assurances should ensure that a suitable degree of protection with regard, for 
example, to the fairness of the trial.  Othman (Abu Qatada) v. U.K., HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int, 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  
55
 That is not to say, however, that these issues are not raised in deportation cases; Üner v. 
Netherlands, HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int, (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR ruled that a ten-year expulsion order imposed on an individual who had family ties to the 
Netherlands was a proportionate and lawful interference with this right. In reaching its judgment the 
court provided guidance as to how the balancing act would be construed in Article 8 ECHR terms).  
Khan v. United Kingdom, HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int, (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (interpreting 
these criteria more recently to reach the obverse conclusion); Omojudi v. United Kingdom, HUDOC, 
http://www.echr.coe.int, (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (showing that family ties may be sufficiently strong 
so as to cause a violation of Article 8 ECHR). Such cases in the past have aroused significant political 
fallout (See, e.g., Christopher Hope & Caroline Gammell, David Cameron: Scrap the Human Rights 
Act, TELEGRAPH  Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1560975/David-Cameron-
Scrap-the-Human-Rights-Act.html.).  
56
 Soering v. United Kingdom, HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int, (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
57,G7KHFRXUWUHIXVHGWRVXJJHVWWKDWWKH$UWLFOHRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV
LVVXHVKRXOGEHGHWHUPLQHGRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHFLYLOVWDQGDUGRISURRI2WKPDQY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH
+RPH 'HS¶W >@ 8.6,$& >@ 6LPLODU SULQFLSOHV ZRXOG DSSO\ WR $UWLFOH  RI WKH
(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV 
585Y6SHFLDO$GMXGLFDWRUH[SDUWH8OODK>@8.+/>@ 
59
 ³7KH&RXUWWKHUHIRUHFRQVLGHUVWKDW«LWLVSRVVLEOHIRU$UWLFOHWRDSSO\LQDQH[SXOVLRQFDVH
Hence, the Court considers that a Contracting State would be in violation of Article 5 if it removed an 
applicant to a State where he or she was at real risk of a flagrant breach of that Article. However, as 
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Reliance on these provisions in a deportation context may be the 
exception rather than the rule given the high threshold involved, but these 
rights-based bars must not be ignored.60  In a recent application to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg, the notorious 
terrorist Abu Qatada (Omar Othman) successfully argued that deportation 
to Jordan would violate his right to a fair trial since there was a risk that he 
would be subjected to a trial in which torture-tainted evidence would be 
admitted upon his return.61  Notwithstanding the Qatada decision, 
however, the greatest bar to deportation is formed by the prohibition on 
torture and ill-tUHDWPHQW DQG VSHFLILFDOO\ WKH ³QRQ-UHIRXOHPHQW´ 
obligation.62  In a European context, the principal consideration is whether 
there is a real risk that an individual will be subjected to ill-treatment or 
torture contrary to Article 3 ECHR upon their return.63  Before the 
solution, deportation through the use of assurances, is explored, it is first 
necessary to assess the key jurisprudence. 
A.  The prohibition of torture: jus cogens erga omnes 
The Convention Against Torture (CAT)64 provides non-derogable 
overarching international principles.65  Extradition, expulsion, or ³refouler´ 
of an individual to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing 
there to be a real danger that he would be subjected to torture are 
prohibited.66  Despite having some seventy-eight signatories and 147 
                                                                                                                          
with Article 6, a high threshold must apply. A flagrant breach of Article 5 would occur only if, for 
example, the receiving State arbitrarily detained an applicant for many years without any intention of 
bringing him or her to trial. A flagrant breach of Article 5 might also occur if an applicant would be at 
risk of being imprisoned for a substantial period in the receiving State, having previously been 
FRQYLFWHG DIWHU D IODJUDQWO\ XQIDLU WULDO´ 2WKPDQ $EX 4DWDGD Y 8QLWHG .LQJGRP +8'2&
http://www.echr.coe.int, (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
60
 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int, (last visited Nov. 
1, 2012). 
612WKPDQ$EX4DWDGDY8QLWHG.LQJGRP+8'2&KWWSZZZHFKUFRHLQWODVWYLVLWHG1RY
7KHHQVXLQJGLUHFWLQYROYHPHQWRIWKH8.3ULPH0LQLVWHUDQG+RPH6HFUHWDU\KDYHSURYHQ
QHFHVVDU\LQDQDWWHPSWWRREWDLQIXUWKHUDVVXUDQFHVIURP-RUGDQWKDWVXFKHYLGHQFHZLOOQRWEHXVHGLQ
FRXUW6HH3DWULFN:LQWRXU7KHUHVD0D\WR9LVLW-RUGDQIRU$EX4DWDGD'HSRUWDWLRQ7DONV*8$5',$1
)HE  KWWSZZZJXDUGLDQFRXNZRUOGIHEWKHUHVD-PD\-MRUGDQ-DEX-TDWDGD6HHDOVR
(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV5XOHVRI&RXUW5XOH LQIUDQRWHDQG WKHGLVFXVVLRQLQ WKH
DFFRPSDQ\LQJWH[W 
62
 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S, No.5; CAT, supra note 
26. See also infra text accompanying notes 86±91 (discussing the Chahal FRXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH
non-refoulement principle). 
63
 Chahal v. United Kingdom, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
648QLWHG1DWLRQV&RQYHQWLRQ$JDLQVW7RUWXUHDQG2WKHU&UXHO,QKXPDQRU'HJUDGLQJ7UHDWPHQW
RU3XQLVKPHQW8176KHUHLQDIWHU&$7 
65
 IdDWDUW&$7SURYLGHVWKDW³1RH[FHSWLRQDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVZKDWVRHYHUZKHWKHUDVWDWH
of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as 
DMXVWLILFDWLRQRIWRUWXUH´ 
66
 CAT, supra note 26, at art. 3.  
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parties,67 a number of these States still possess questionable human rights 
records in the area.68  The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
195169 has an impact, yet the applicability of this general prohibition on 
returning an individual to face torture or ill-treatment70 is circumscribed.  
Protection under the Refugee Convention is excluded where an individual 
has committed acts contrary to the purposes of the United Nations, which 
in practice includes acts of terrorism,71 whether this was before or after the 
UHIXJHH FDPH ZLWKLQ WKH 6WDWH¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ72  Indeed, as the House of 
Lords has observed, arguments against deportation raised by terrorist 
suspects under the Refugee Convention are largely academic,73 since, even 
if an individual is entitled to invoke its provisions, he would still be 
prevented from relying on the prohibition of refoulement.74 
In a U.K. setting, the key protection is by means of Article 3 ECHR, 
which does have robust enforcement mechanisms at both European and 
domestic levels.75  Article 3 ECHR prohibits torture, as well as inhumane 
                                                                                                                          
67
 UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch. 
4, § 9, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang 
= enId. at art. 4(9). 
68
 See, for example, Jordan, Algeria and Pakistan: all three of these states are considered, in the 
absence of specific assurances to the contrary, to potentially pose a risk of torture and/or ill-treatment 
by U.K. authorities.  For Jordan and Algeria, see, e.g., 5%$OJ)&	DQRWKHUY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRU
WKH+RPH'HS¶W22-RUGDQY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8.+/)RU3DNLVWDQ
see 527 PARL. DEB., H.C. (2011) 465 (U.K.). 
69
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (1951) art. 33 [hereinafter 
Refugee Convention]. 
70
 Id. at art. 33(1). 
71
 ,PPLJUDWLRQ $V\OXP DQG 1DWLRQDOLW\ $FW  F    GHILQLQJ WHUURULVP DV ³DFWVRI
FRPPLWWLQJSUHSDULQJRULQVWLJDWLQJWHUURULVP´DQG³HQFRXUDJLQJRULQGXFLQJRWKHUVWRFRPPLW
SUHSDUHRU LQVWLJDWH WHUURULVP    ´7KLVKDVEHHQFULWicized and subjected to change following the 
recommendations of the Joint committee on Human Rights.  JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TERRORISM BILL AND RELATED MATTERS, 2005-
06, H.L. 75-II, at 171-47, H.C. 561-II, at 171-74 (U.K.).  From an international perspective, a difficulty 
with this exclusion lies in the fact that there is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism, and 
attempts to provide such have failed, due largely to the reservations of the United States that it would 
politicize the International Criminal Court. See Rene Bruin & Kees Wouters, Terrorism and the Non-
derogability of Non-refoulement, 15 INT¶L J. OF REFUGEE L. 5, 5±6, 15. 
72
 RB (Alg.) (FC) & another, [2009] UKHL 10, at [128] ± [29]. 
73
 Id. at [129]. 
74
 Refugee Convention, supra note 70, at art. 33(2) provides that this protection may not be 
FODLPHGE\DUHIXJHH³ZKRPWKHUHDUHUHDVRQDEOHJURXQGVIRUUHJDUGLQJDVDGDQJHUWRWKHVHFXULW\RI
the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
FULPHFRQVWLWXWHVDGDQJHUWRWKHFRPPXQLW\RIWKDWFRXQWU\´ 
75
 At a European Level, the European Court of Human Rights hears cases involving alleged 
breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights and has a broad range of powers: its decisions 
are binding on European member states and can enforce the award of compensation where a breach is 
found. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, established under the European Convention of the same name, makes visits to member 
States and produces reports. Other International documents which prohibit torture, of which detailed 
analysis lies beyond the ambit of this article, include the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons 
from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., 2433rd plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/30/3452 (Dec. 
9, 1975); Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 5, Dec. 10, 1948; International Covenant on Civil 
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and degrading treatment, in absolute terms.76  No derogation from it is 
permissible, even in wartime; nor is there any allowable justification in 
terms of public benefit, national security, or public safety.77  The United 
Kingdom, however, does not enjoy an unblemished reputation in this area; 
experience in relation to Northern Ireland terrorism casts sharp focus on 
interrogation methods and conditions of detention for terrorist suspects.78  
In Ireland v UK,79 the ECtHR ruled that the United Kingdom had breached 
its obligations under Article 3 ECHR by the adoption of a range of 
interrogation techniques inter alia inFOXGLQJKRRGLQJVXEMHFWLRQWR³white 
noise,´ sleep deprivation, reduced diet, and the use of stress positions.80  
Despite the quick denunciation of these infamous techniques,81 Article 3 
(&+5FRQWLQXHVWRVKDFNOHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRXQWHU-terrorism strategy.82  
The obligations imposed by this European Treaty have significant 
ramifications on removal policies for both America and the United 
Kingdom.83  
                                                                                                                          
and Political Rights art. 7, Dec.19 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 172; and European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Mar. 1, 2002, 26.XI.1987. 
See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field arts. 3, 12, 50, Aug.12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 31. Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 
arts. 3, 12, 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 85. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War arts. 3, 17, 87, 130, Aug.12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 135. Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 3, 32, 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 287.  
76
 To this extent, Article 3 of the ECHR offers a broader scope of protection than CAT, which 
merely prohibits torture. 
77
 See, judgment in Balough v. Hungary, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
78
 See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) 
79
 Id. 
80
 Id. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that such practices amounted not to torture, but 
to inhuman treatment, contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. European 
Convention on Human Rights, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S, No.5. 
81
 7KH*RYHUQPHQWJDYHDQ³XQTXDOLILHGXQGHUWDNLQJWKDWWKH
ILYHWHFKQLTXHV
ZLOOQRWLQDQ\
circumVWDQFHV EH UHLQWURGXFHG DV DQ DLG WR LQWHUURJDWLRQ´ Ireland, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
82
 See the ruling in Saadi v. Italy, HUDOC, http://echroe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012)  at 45±46 
(2009) (discussed below), which was seized on by the Conservative Party in election manifesto as part 
of the rationale for scrapping the HRA and replacing it with a Bill of Rights. The governments have 
since distanced themselves from this rather disingenuous proposal, and the Prime Minister has 
indicated that assurances are now the priority when it comes to securing Convention-compliant 
deportations. See 510 PARL. DEB., H.C. (2010) 434 (U.K.).  
83These ramifications arise since the European Court of Human Rights imposes a duty on all 
member States in respect of those citizens within the jurisdiction of that State. European Convention on 
Human Rights art. 1,  Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S, No.5. See generally M .v. Denmark, HUDOC, 
http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). It follows that the obligations placed on the U.K. 
government apply to those individuals who could be removed from the United States, and vice versa. 
These issues have recently been highlighted by the controversial transfer of Abu Hamza from the 
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom to the United States to face trial. See Owen Bowcott, Abu Hamza 
Extradition to US Goes ahead after Court Defeat, THE GUARDIAN (London) (Oct. 6, 2012 9:17 AM),  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/05/abu-hamza-loses-extradition-appeal.  
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B.  European Influences: The Chahal Benchmarks and Beyond 
The ECtHR has made it clear that ECHR rights apply extra-
territorially, even where a receiving country is not a signatory to the 
ECHR.84  Similarly, it is clear that even where a receiving country provides 
assurances, the Article 3 burden is not necessarily discharged.85  In Chahal 
v UK,86 the ECtHR was invited, inter alia, to assess whether the 
deportation of a failed asylum seeker and terrorist suspect to India would 
violate his rights under Article 3 ECHR.  Reaffirming the absolute nature 
of the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment,87 the 
Court held that the behavior of the individual in question, however 
undesirable, was irrelevant: 
 
[W]henever substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that an individual would face a real risk of being 
subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to 
another State, the responsibility of the Contracting State to 
safeguard him or her against such treatment is engaged in the 
event of expulsion.88 
 
The Court was anxious to clarify that ³it should not be inferred that 
there is any room for balancing the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons 
for expulsion in determining whether a State's responsibility under Article 
3 is engaged´89  The ECtHR was not persuaded that such assurances 
would provide an adequate guarantee of safety, particularly since the 
violation of human rights by certain members of the security forces in 
Punjab and elsewhere in India was an ³enduring problem.´90 
The effect of Chahal was to set a series of benchmarks; a European 
State cannot deport a terrorist suspect to their country of origin should 
there be a real risk of the individual being subjected to treatment contrary 
                                                                                                                          
84
 In Soering v. U.K., HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012), the applicant 
challenged the decision of the U.K. government to extradite a West German national to the U.S. to face 
a murder charge, which carried with it the death penalty.  The ECtHR considered that in light of all of 
the circumstances, the mental anguish of awaiting execution on death row could lead to suffering 
contrary to Article 3 ECHR. if he was extradited. The ECtHR held that while Article 1 ECHR set a 
territorial limit on the reach of the Convention, and did not require contracting states to impose 
Convention standards on other states, the provisions had to be interpreted and applied in a manner as to 
make its safeguards practical and effective. Id. 
85
 The European Court of Human Rights. indicated that it must be satisfied that any assurance 
given is likely to remove the risk that the death penalty will be imposed. Id.  
86
 Chahal v. U.K., HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
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 Id.  
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to Article 3 if returned.91  The ECtHR has made it explicit that ³a mere 
possibility of ill-WUHDWPHQW«LV QRW LQ LWVHOI VXIILFLHQW WR JLYH ULVH WR D
breach of Article 3´92  Assurances that an individual will not be tortured or 
subjected to ill-treatment may assuage the risk, but this might not always 
be the case.93  The Court will consider the entire factual matrix and 
determine whether this risk exists.94  From the perspective of Article 3 
compliant deportations, therefore, Chahal represents a significant 
roadblock for governments wishing to neutralize a national security threat 
in this way.  In a bid to circumvent these difficulties, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the United Kingdom has developed and 
facilitated the signing of formal diplomatic assurances, known as 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU),95 with Algeria, Ethiopia, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Libya.96 The FCO is also actively pursuing a MOU with 
Pakistan.97  Simultaneously, the government has sought to challenge the 
Chahal ruling alongside other European countries.98 
In Saadi v Italy,99 the complainant was a Tunisian national who had 
submitted that he would be subjected to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 
ECHR if he was deported.  The Italian embassy in Tunisia requested 
diplomatic assurances from the Tunisian government that Saadi would not 
be subjected to ill-treatment upon his return.100  As to the nature of the 
assurances, the Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs sent notes to the 
,WDOLDQ HPEDVV\ LWHUDWLQJ WKDW 7XQLVLDQ ODZV JXDUDQWHHG SULVRQHUV¶ ULJKWV
and that Tunisia had acceded to the relevant laws and conventions 
(including CAT).101  The United Kingdom joined with Italy as a third party 
intervener in the case, arguing that a distinction must be drawn between 
treatment inflicted directly by a signatory State and treatment that might be 
                                                                                                                          
91
 Id.  
92
 Shamayev & Others v. Georgia & Russia, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 
2012) at ¶ 352 (Apr. 12, 2005). 
93
 Chahal v. U.K., HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  
94
 Id.    
95
 7KHXVHRIWKHWHUP³0HPRUDQGDRI8QGHUVWDQGLQJ´028DQG³GLSORPDWLFDVVXUDQFHV´FDQ
RIWHQ EH PLVOHDGLQJ VLQFH WKH\ PD\ GHQRWH GLIIHUHQW IRUPDOL]HG DJUHHPHQWV ³$VVXUDQFHV´ XVXDOO\
denote negotiation for promises with regard to a specific individual; MOU are broad agreements that 
cover the treatment of more than one individual.  
96
 +20( '(3$570(17, supra note 34, ¶ 8.27. Note that a formal MOU is not in place with 
Algeria; instead there is reliance placed on a series of written correspondence between the respective 
governments. 
97
 527 PARL. DEB., H.C. (2011) 465 (U.K.). 
98
 See the Joint document submitted to the European Court of Human Rights by the United 
Kingdom, Portugal, Slovakia and Lithuania in Ramzy v. The Netherlands App. No. 25424/05, 
contained in Annex 2, of JCHR report: JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, The Human Rights Act: 
the DCA and Home Office Reviews, Thirty-Second Report of Session, 2005-06, H.L. 278, H.C. 1716, 
Annex 2.  
99
 Saadi v. Italy, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  
100
 Id.  
101
 Id..  
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inflicted by the authorities of another State, and that protection against this 
latter form of ill-treatment should be weighed against the interests of the 
community as a whole.102  This argument was fundamentally rejected by 
the Court, which stated that there ³was no basis for drawing any distinction 
between treatment inflicted by a State party to the Convention and a third-
party State. To do so would undermine the protections of art.3.´103  
Unequivocally the Court affirmed its previous directions under Chahal.104  
The Court denounced as ³misconceived´ the argument that the risk posed 
by a suspect must be balanced against the risk of harm to the community, 
since the two could only be assessed independently.105  
Saadi makes it clear that notwithstanding the decision of a domestic 
court, each assurance will be subject to further judicial challenge in 
Strasbourg, which will assess all of the facts of the case106 and determine 
whether sufficient safeguards have been provided.107  Assurances given 
hurriedly are unlikely to suffice.108  Such intervention into removal 
proceedings by the ECtHR has become increasingly prolific,109 with 
                                                                                                                          
102
 Id.  
103
 Id.  
104
 Id. The courW QRWHG WKH ³LPPHQVHGLIILFXOWLHV IDFHGE\ VWDWHV LQPRGHUQ WLPHV LQSURWHFWLQJ
WKHLUFRPPXQLWLHV IURP WHUURULVWYLROHQFH«7KDWPXVWQRWKRZHYHUFDOO LQWRTXHVWLRQ WKHDEVROXWH
QDWXUH RI DUW ´ DQG SURFHHGHG WR DIILUP LWV Chahal directions. Chahal v. U.K., HUDOC, 
http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
105
  ³(LWKHU WKHHYLGHQFH DGGXFHGEHIRUH WKH&RXUW UHYHDOV WKDW WKHUH LV D VXEVWDQWLDO ULVN LI WKH
person is sent back or it does not. The prospect that he may pose a serious threat to the community if 
not returned does not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill treatment that the person may be 
subject to on return. For that reason it would be incorrect to require a higher standard of proof, as 
submitted by the intervener, where the person is considered to represent a serious danger to the 
FRPPXQLW\VLQFHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHOHYHORIULVNLVLQGHSHQGHQWRIVXFKDWHVW´There was a violation 
of Article 3 ECHR since there were substantial grounds for believing that Saadi would face a real risk 
of treatment contrary to Article 3. Saadi v. Italy, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 
2012). 
106
 Id. 
107
 See RB (Alg.) (FC) & another, [2009] UKHL 10, at [107] ± [08], [158], [265].  (The House of 
/RUGV¶DIILUPDWLRQRIWKH028ZLWK$OJHULDDQG-RUGDQLQRB). . 
108
 Abdelhedi v. Italy, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int  (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). See also Sandi v. 
Italy, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  
109
 The ECtHR. has affirmed its Saadi precedent in several cases. In Ismoilov .v Russia, HUDOC, 
http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012), the Court halted a Russian extradition since the 
assurances given were not considered to amount to a reliable guarantee against ill-treatment; and 
likewise this was the rationale for the court ruling with regard to an extradition to Turkmenistan in 
Ryabikin v. Russia, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). In N. v. Sweden, HUDOC, 
http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012), the Court held deportation of a female divorcee to 
Afghanistan would violate her Article 3 rights due to her personal circumstances; and similarly in Klein 
v. Russia, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012), an extradition with assurances to 
Columbia was considered to violate Article 3 ECHR since the value of the assurances was questionable 
due to the documented instances of abusive practices by the Columbian authorities. In Dauodi v. 
France, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012),  the ECtHR held that removal of the 
applicant from France to Algeria would breach Article 3 due to the documented conditions of detention 
and ill-treatment in Algerian prisons and in the absence of formal assurances. 
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Strasbourg frequently invoking its Rule 39 procedure110 to stay extraditions 
or deportations.111 
One high-profile case112 has been the stay of extradition granted to Abu 
Hamza pending a ruling regarding the compatibility of the conditions of 
imprisonment with Article 3 ECHR.  The ECtHR, in a judgment that is not 
yet final,113 has ruled that there is no incompatibility and the extradition 
can proceed.  Both the U.K. government and the U.S. Department of 
Justice have welcomed the decision.114  Elsewhere, however, there have 
been a number of other such decisions in which the Strasbourg court has 
shown the impotence of the Rule 39 procedure.115  The Human Rights 
Commissioner notes at least four occasions where Italy has ignored such 
interim measures.116  
There are inherent tensions reconciling Convention principles with 
national security in terrorist removal cases; European governments have 
therefore challenged the Chahal and Saadi benchmarks.117  In A. v The 
Netherlands,118 the applicant complained of a risk of ill-treatment contrary 
                                                                                                                          
110
 Mamatkulov & Askarov v. Turkey, HUDOC, http://echrcoe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012), 
Rule 39 of the Rules of the European Court of Human Rights allows interim measures to be taken by 
the court where there is an imminent risk of irreparable damage to life, or a threat of ill-treatment 
contrary to Article 3 ECHR, and may involve the court temporarily staying removal proceedings 
pending judgment. See European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, supra note 61. 
111
 ³)RU WKRVHZKRPLJKWIDFHD ULVNRIYLRODWLRQRI WKHLUKXPDQULJKWV WKH&RXUW LVRIWHQWKHLU
ultimate hope to stop a forced return to a country where they could be exposed to treatment in violation 
RIWKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV  ´+XPDQ5LJKWV&RPPLVVLRQHU, European States 
0XVW 5HVSHFW 6WUDVERXUJ &RXUW¶V 2UGHUV WR +DOW 'HSRUWDWLRQV THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
COMMISIONER¶S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMENT (June 25, 2010, 9:04 AM), http://commissioner.cws.coe.int/ 
tiki-view_blog_post.php?postId=52. 
112
 See, e.g., Dominic Casciani, Abu  Hamza  US  Extradition  Halted, BBC NEWS, July 8, 2010, 
11:50 AM) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10551784; Vikram Dodd,  Abu Hamza Extradition to US 
Blocked by European Court, THE GUARDIAN (July 8, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/ 
2010/jul/08/abu-hamza-human-rights-ruling?INTCMP=SRCH; Philip Johnston, Abu Hamza 
Extradition to US Blocked on Human Rights Grounds, TELEGRAPH  (July 8, 2010),  
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/philipjohnston/100046585/abu-hamza-extradition-to-us-blocked-on-
human-rights-grounds/. 
113
 Babar Ahmad & Others v. U.K., HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
On 9th July 2012, an application was lodged (on the eve of the three month deadline for such 
applications) for a referral to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. The Court 
will decide on admissibility within six to eight weeks of that date. 
114
 Martin Beckford, Abu Hamza Extradition Could Take Months as David Cameron Welcomes 
European Court Ruling, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 10, 2012, 7:39 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9195669/Abu-Hamza-extradition-could-take-months-as-David-Cameron-
welcomes-European-court-ruling.html;  John F. Burns & Alan Cowell, European Court Says Britain 
Can Send Terror Suspects to U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2012),  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/ 
world/europe/european-court-says-britain-may-deport-terror-suspects.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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 See Human Rights Commissioner, supra note 111.  
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 Id. See also Ben Khemais v. Italy, HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 
2012). A violation of Article 3 ECHR was found when the interim measure was ignored and the 
individual deported to Tunisia, despite the fact that the Tunisian assurances were not considered by the 
European Court of Human Rights as sufficient to guard against ill-treatment. 
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to Article 3 ECHR if he was to be removed to Libya and was granted a stay 
of removal pursuant to Rule 39.  The respondent government argued that 
the ³mere possibility of ill-treatment´ was insufficient to assume that 
expulsion is incompatible with Article 3 ECHR.119  A central tenet to the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VVXEPLVVLRQVZDVWKDW 
 
[A] thorough investigation was necessary not only to 
GHWHUPLQH LI WKH DOLHQ «KDV DGHTXDWHO\ HVWDEOLVKHG WKDW KH
can expect to be subjected to treatment prohibited by Article 
3 upon returning to his country of origin, but also because it 
was necessary to ensure that the State is not simply forced to 
resign itself to the alien's presence which may represent a 
threat to the fundamental rights of its citizens.120  
 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Portugal and the United Kingdom all intervened 
and argued that the rigidity of the Chahal principle was causing difficulty 
for States by preventing them from enforcing expulsion measures.121  The 
interveners suggested that the Chahal benchmark should be altered in two 
significant ways.  First, the threat presented by the person to be deported 
must be a factor assessed in relation to the possibility and the nature of the 
potential ill-treatment.122  Next, national security considerations had to 
influence the standard of proof required of the applicant, so that if the 
sending State adduced evidence that there was a threat to national security, 
stronger evidence had to be adduced to prove that the applicant would be at 
risk of ill-treatment in the receiving country.123  In such instances, the 
interveners proposed that the individual must show they are ³more likely 
than not´ going to be subjected to ill-treatment.124  These arguments were 
countered by NGOs, who suggested that assurances did not suffice to 
offset a risk of torture125 and that no balancing exercise should be 
permissible under International Law or through Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.126 
 
                                                                                                                          
119
 Id.  
120
 Id. 
121
 Id.  
122
 Id.  This argument would mean that the standard of proof adopted by the European Court of 
Human Rights in respect to Article 3 ECHR would mirror the standard of proof required in U.S. 
deportation proceedings under CAT.  
123
 A. v. The Neth., HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
124
 Id.  
125
 The submissions of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.  Id.   
126
 See the submissions of Liberty and JUSTICE. Id.   
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Unsurprisingly, the Court rejected the government¶s submissions127 
and applied its earlier decision of Saadi: the prohibition against torture or 
ill-treatment applies irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned.128 
While it appears that the Chahal and Saadi benchmarks are intact and will 
continue to trouble the government, they do not preclude the operation of a 
DWA regime.129  The seminal challenge by Abu Qatada130 provides 
important guidance here.  Qatada is a Jordanian national wanted for 
terrorism-related offences in several countries, and has been referred to by 
a Spanish jXGJH DV 2VDPD %LQ /DGHQ¶V ULJKW-hand man in Europe.131 
Qatada claimed asylum in the United Kingdom and was granted leave to 
remain there until 1999.132  He had been convicted in absentia in Jordan as 
part of a conspiracy for various offences.133  Some evidence had come to 
OLJKW LQ WKH WULDOV WKDW 4DWDGD¶V FR-defendants had been subjected to ill-
treatment and torture, but these allegations had not been fully investigated 
and were deemed unproven.134  After being subjected to the U.K.¶VYDULRXV
counter-terrorism regimes of detention and control orders, Qatada was 
served with a deportation notice and was correspondingly detained for that 
purpose.135  
Qatada challenged the legality of his removal on the basis of the fact 
that the human rights situation in Jordan meant that there would be a risk 
of subjection to torture or ill-treatment upon his return, a violation of 
Article 3 ECHR, and that the assurances given by the Jordanian 
government to the contrary were insufficient to mitigate against that risk.136  
He simultaneously argued that he faced a violation of his right to liberty 
and security, contrary to Article 5 ECHR, and his right to a fair trial, 
contrary to Article 6 ECHR.137  The ensuing appeals made their way 
through SIAC,138 the Court of Appeal,139 and the House of Lords, with 
                                                                                                                          
127
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 See generally  Chahal v. U.K., HUDOC, http://echroe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012); Saadi v. 
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their Lordships ruling that the deportation was lawful.140  
The Qatada judgment will be pivotal to the development of assurances 
both in Europe generally and in the United Kingdom specifically.  The 
ECtHR held that the correct approach to take would be consistent with its 
previous decisions: Strasbourg would ³consider both the general human 
rights situation in that country and the particular characteristics of the 
applicant´141  Assurances would constitute one relevant factor for the 
Court to consider but ³are not in themselves sufficient to ensure adequate 
protection of ill-tUHDWPHQW«>W@KHZHLJKW WREHJLYHQ WRDVVXUDQFHVIURP
the receiving State depends, in each case, on the circumstances prevailing 
at the material time´142  Drawing on existing case law, the Court 
elucidated a variety of additional factors relevant to an assessment of the 
quality of assurances.143 
Significantly for the government and for the pursuit of DWA strategies 
generally, the Court held that ³the United Kingdom and Jordanian 
Governments have made genuine efforts to obtain and provide transparent 
and detailed assurances to ensure that the applicant will not be ill-treated 
upon return to Jordan;´144 the particular assurances were considered to be 
³VXSHULRU LQERWK«GHWDLO DQG«IRUPDOLW\ WR DQ\DVVXUDQFHVZKLFK WKH
Court has previously examined´145  In light of the specific circumstances, 
deportation to Jordan would not violate Article 3 ECHR.146  From this 
perspective, the judgment vindicated the DWA strategy of the U.K. 
government and effectively paves the way for more terrorist removals.147 
Despite this partial victory, the alternative finding of the ECtHR that 
4DWDGD¶V UHWXUQ ZRXOG YLRODWH $UWLFOH  (&+5 KDV FDXVHG FRQVLGHUDEOH
consternation.148  The caustic debate aimed at a perceived diminution of 
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national sovereignty vis-à-vis an increased willingness of the Court to rule 
against offending statute and common law precedent, with the focal point 
of these arguments shifting from the voting rights of prisoners149 to a glut 
of immigration-related decisions under the Rule 39 procedure.150  On April 
29th, 2011, a High Level Conference of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe issued a declaration that sought to limit ECtHR 
involvement in deportation and extradition hearings.151  The declaration: 
 
Invites the Court, when examining cases related to asylum 
and immigration, to assess and take full account of the 
effectiveness of domestic procedures and, where these 
procedures are seen to operate fairly and with respect for 
human rights, to avoid intervening except in the most 
exceptional circumstances.152 
 
This statement complements the orthodox position that the ECtHR is 
not that of a ³fourth-instance´ court and it should therefore avoid ³re-
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³EHKLQGEDUV´Id. at 165. 
149
 In Hirst v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that the United 
.LQJGRP¶VEODQNHWEDQRQSULVRQHUV¶YRWLQJ rights was a violation of Article 3 of the First Protocol to 
WKH (&+5 7KH LVVXH ZDV SXW WR ³FRQVXOWDWLRQ´ EXW XOWLPDWHO\ WKH EDQ ZDV QRW OLIWHG +8'2&
http://echrcoe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). See generally Isobel White, HOUSE OF COMMONS 
LIBRARY SN/PC/01764, PRISONERS¶ VOTING RIGHTS, (2011). 
MPs debated the issue and, in a non-binding free vote, passed a motion upholding the status quo by 234 
votes to 22 (with ministerial and opposition abstentions). PARL. DEB., H.C. (2011) 584. 
150
 In Ismoilov v. Russia, the Court halted a Russian extradition since the assurances given were 
not considered to amount to a reliable guarantee against ill-treatment. HUDOC, http://echrcoe.int (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2012).  Likewise, this was the rationale for the Court ruling with regard to an extradition 
to Turkmenistan in Ryabikin v. Russia.HUDOC, http://echrcoe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). In N v. 
Sweden, the European Court held deportation of a female divorcee to Afghanistan would violate her 
Article 3 rights due to her personal circumstances.  HUDOC, http://echrcoe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 
2012). Similarly in Klein v. Russia, , the Court held that an extradition with assurances to Columbia 
violated Article 3 ECHR since the value of the assurances was questionable due to the documented 
instances of abusive practices by the Columbian authorities.  HUDOC, http://echrcoe.int (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2012). In Daoudi v. France, the Court held that removal of the applicant from France to 
Algeria would breach Article 3 due to the documented conditions of detention and ill-treatment in 
Algerian prisons (Unlike the United Kingdom, France had not arranged any assurances with the 
Algerian authorities. HUDOC, http://echrcoe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). SIAC in the United 
.LQJGRPKDVWKHUHIRUHGLVWLQJXLVKHGWKLVFDVH7Y6HF¶\6WDWH+RPH'HS¶W>@ UKSAIC 31/2005, 
18. 
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 See generally TURKISH CHAIRMANSHIP, HIGH LEVEL CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 2011), available at   http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/ 
standardsetting/conferenceizmir/Declaration%20Izmir%20E.pdf.  
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 Id.  
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examination of issues of fact and law decided by national courts´153   
These developments may limit future ECtHR involvement in such cases. 
Perhaps as a result of these altercations, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR 
UHIXVHG4DWDGD¶VDSSOLFDWLRQWRRYHUUXOHWKHGHFLVLRQZLWKWKHFRQVHTXHQFH
that the judgment is now final with 4DWDGD¶V LQGLYLGXDO FDVH SURFHHGLQJ
through the U.K. courts.154  The precedent provides invaluable guidance to 
interested governments as to how an effective DWA regime may be 
implemented.  Nonetheless, there remain myriad criticisms directed 
towards a DWA regime, and before these issues are examined, it is first 
worthwhile analyzing the markedly different approach taken in the United 
States. 
III. REMOVAL FROM THE UNITED STATES: TRUSTING THE EXECUTIVE 
Assurances are routinely sought by the United States but their 
formulation and use is left largely to the executive branch; few specific 
details are released to the public regarding the content or compliance with 
such assurances following their formulation.155  Protection against ill-
treatment and torture is analogous to that in the United Kingdom; the 
European Commission on Human Rights has asserted the similarity 
between the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 3 
ECHR in the context of the severity of treatment required to invoke its 
protection.156  CAT was ratified by the United States in 1994 with the 
reservation that the prohibition was taken only insofar as it mirrored the 
protection afforded by the U.S. Constitution.157  Unsurprisingly, this 
reservation has been criticized, since it could be argued that it is trumped 
by jus cogens principles of international law and that it imbues the U.S. 
legal order with a lower standard of protection against torture and ill-
                                                                                                                          
153
 Id. A Commission has been established in the United Kingdom to look at reform of the 
European Court of Human Rights given its immense workload and backlog of cases, which currently 
stands in excess of 152,000 (as of November 2011). EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS 
OF STATISTICS 2011, (2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/7B68F865-2B15-
4DFC-85E5-DEDD8C160AC1/0/Stats_EN_112011.pdf. The Commission has, inter alia, made interim 
recommendations to ministers that urgent reform should be pursued in a time-bound program during 
WKH 8.¶V &KDLUPDQVKLS RI WKH &RXQFLO RI (XURSH WKRXJK PLQLVWHUV KDYH PDGH LW FOHDU WKDW IXUWKHU
reform will take time to achieve. Letter from Sir Leigh Lewis, Chair, Commission on a Bill of Rights, 
to Rt. Hon. Nick Clegg MP, Deputy Prime Minister & Lord President of the Privy Council, & Rt. Hon. 
Kenneth Clarke MP QC, Lord Chancellor & Secretary of State for Justice (July 28, 2011), available at  
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/cbr/cbr-court-reform-interim-advice.pdf. Some inroads 
have already been made with Protocol 14, which came into force in 2010. 
154
 The courts will now examine the fair trial implications of the Jordanian assurances in light of 
the ECtHR ruling, but deportation of Qatada is unlikely before October 2012. 
155
 See generally COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, PROMISES TO KEEP: 
DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AGAINST TORTURE IN͒US TERRORISM TRANSFERS, Dec. 2010, available at, 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights_Institute/Promises%20to%20Keep.pdf. 
156
 Soering v. United Kingdom, HUDOC, http://echrcoe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  
157
 US Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (Oct. 27, 1990).  
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treatment than that observed on an international arena.158 Further 
implementation of CAT at a domestic level followed with the Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA),159 although the statute 
expressly prevented the courts from exercising jurisdiction over these 
cases.160  The fact that FARRA was needed in the first place in order to 
give effect to CAT principles was largely the result of a U.S. Senate 
determination that CAT was not ³self-executing´161 showcasing the 
relative impotence of the current CAT framework. 
In relation to CAT claims, there are distinct similarities between the 
U.S. approach to extradition and deportation, making it appropriate to 
consider both of these in context.162  Regulations made by the executive 
branch under FARRA have made it explicit that it is the function of the 
Secretary of State to decide whether or not to extradite and if assurances 
are necessary; the courts have no role in this process.163  Under CAT, the 
U.S. government has an obligation to ensure an individual is not subjected 
to refoulement, but this obligation is discharged through a nexus of 
executive decisions and approvals as opposed to through judicial scrutiny 
of the removal and/or commensurate assurances.164  This contention was 
challenged in the case of Cornejo-Barreto,165 following which it appeared 
that an individual may be able to petition for habeas corpus 
notwithstanding the statutory and regulatory circumscription of judicial 
review.166  
                                                                                                                          
158
 See, e.g., Bruin & Wouters, supra note 72, at 24, 29 (discussing the non-refoulement 
obligation has acquired jus cogens status); Alice Farmer, µ1RQ-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting 
Anti-7HUURU 0HDVXUHV WKDW 7KUHDWHQ 5HIXJHH 3URWHFWLRQ¶ SELECTEDWORKS (Jun. 12, 2010), 
http://works.bepress.com/alice_farmer/1. See also Human Rights First, Issues to Be Considered During 
the Examination of the Second Periodic Report of the United States of America (CAT/C/48/Add 3/Rev 
1,  Apr. 7, 2006), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06502-etn-hrf-cat-final-
submitted.pdf accessed 12 June 2010.   
159
 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) (2006) [hereinafter 
FARRA].  
160
 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1231(d).   
161
 136 Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990); S. EXEC. REP. 101-30, Senate Advice and Consent to the 
Convention Against Torture, Unanimous Consent Agreement, at III(1) (1990). The requisite 
background to the signing of CAT and the implementation of FARRA has been documented 
extensively but is neatly summarized by the Third Circuit in Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 
218 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
162
 These similarities relate to the significant role played by the executive branch, with limited 
judicial oversight. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.18(c); § 208.18(c) (2012). 
163
 The courts have previously considered that they are ³ill-equipped as institutions´ to second-
guess the executive's extradition decisions. United States v. Smyth (In re Requested Extradition of 
Smyth), 61 F.3d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). While this was rejected in Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 
664, 670 (4th Cir. 2007), judicial involvement has since been circumscribed by FARRA, 8 U.S.C. § 
1231. 
164
  Mironescu, 480 F.3d at 169. 
165
 Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2000). 
166
 The appellate history is complex and the precedent is by no means certain. An appeal to the 
Ninth Circuit did not clarify matters.  The court in Arambasic v. Ashcroft noted that the appeal decision 
had been vacated but that the original judgment had not been. 403 F.Supp.2d 951, 963 (D.S.D. 2005).A 
 
 2012] DEPORTING TERRORIST SUSPECTS WITH ASSURANCES 151 
 
 
The Fourth Circuit, however, did not endorse this position; in 
Mironescu v Costner,167 the contention that the courts were barred through 
the rule of non-inquiry168 from reviewing treatment concerns in habeas 
petitions was rejected.169  In the same judgment, the court held that 
FARRA barred a habeas review of CAT proceedings.170  The resulting 
position is woefully unclear.  Deeks observes that the U.S. courts are 
increasingly reluctant to allow the executive branch to create assurances or 
MOU that are judicially untested, even where the legal basis to intervene is 
weak.171  She also postulates the possibility that the Ninth Circuit may soon 
find that an individual can obtain a habeas corpus review of the Secretary 
RI6WDWH¶VGHFLVLRQWRH[WUDGLWHKLPLQWKHIDFHRIWRUWXUHFRQFHUQV172  
A.  Lessons from America: Deportation of Terrorist Suspects 
Even with a shift in strategy resulting from a change in administration, 
with ³an end to United States exceptionalism and an acceptance of the 
international law framework,´173 some of the war-related rhetoric 
continued under the Obama Administration.174  Despite similarities 
between removal strategies for non-Guantánamo detainees, the 
commensurate standard of legal protection is markedly different when 
assurances are sought.175  It is therefore necessary to first consider 
deportation of non-Guantánamo inmates before turning to consider those 
detained in the ³legal black hole´176   
In terms of deportation practice, the U.S. approach is somewhat better 
than that for extradition, providing a comparably higher degree of judicial 
scrutiny while lacking the robust judicial safeguards found in the United 
Kingdom.177  For individuals facing deportation, removal will be deferred 
                                                                                                                          
similar approach was subsequently taken by the Ninth Circuit in Prasoprat v. Benov. 421 F.3d 1009, 
1011-12 (9th Cir. 2005). 
167
 Mironescu, 480 F.3d at 677. 
168
 ³>8@QGHU ZKDW LV FDOOHG WKH ³UXOH RI QRQ-LQTXLU\´ LQ H[WUDGLWLRQ ODZ FRXUWV LQ WKLV FRXQWU\ 
refrain from examining the penal systems of requesting nations, leaving to the Secretary of State 
determinations of whether the defeQGDQWLVOLNHO\WREHWUHDWHGKXPDQHO\´Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 
F.3d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997). 
169
 Mironescu, 480 F.3d 644 at 670. 
170
 Id. at 674. 
171
 Ashley Deeks, Promises Not to Torture: Diplomatic Assurances in U.S. Courts, AMER. SOC. 
IN¶TL. L., 10 (2008). 
172
 Id. at 21. 
173
 Róisín Pillay, Current Challenges Regarding Respect of Human Rights In the Fight Against 
Terrorism, EUR. PARL. DOC. EXPO/B/DROI/2009/27, PE 410.208,  (Apr. 2010) 14.  
174
 Id. at 15. 
175
 Id. 
176
 Steyn, supra note 2, at 1.  
177
 See infra text accompanying notes 380±84. 
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if they are considered to be ³more likely than not´ tortured upon their 
return;178 likewise the U.S. Senate179 has interpreted Article 3 CAT to 
require the same standard of proof.180  If new evidence comes to light or if 
the government negotiates arrangements with a receiving country, any 
deferral of removal can be terminated following an evidentiary hearing, 
with provision for appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).181  
Generally, habeas corpus is available to a person held in custody ³in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.´182  As 
is the case in an extradition context, there have been notable steps taken in 
immigration law to limit judicial involvement in removal cases in the 
context of CAT.183  If assurances are used, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, will undertake a 
determination as to their effectiveness and reliability in terms of 
discharging the CAT burden.184  Once this claim has been lodged, an 
immigration judge, the BIA, or an asylum officer may give no further 
consideration of CAT.185  Despite the limited use of assurances, there has 
been some litigation challenging these principles.186 
The key issues at play in this area are best illustrated with reference to 
the non-terrorism related case of Khouzam v Hogan.187  Khouzam was an 
Egyptian national who was facing removal given the decision of an 
immigration judge that there were substantial grounds for believing him to 
have murdered a woman in Egypt.  In accordance with the procedure 
above,188 the U.S. government obtained assurances from the Egyptian 
authorities.189  $FFRUGLQJO\ .KRX]DP¶V GHIHUUDO RI UHPRYDO ZDV
terminated, and he petitioned the Second Circuit for habeas corpus,190 
claiming that he faced removal pursuant to inherently unreliable diplomatic 
assurances from Egypt without any opportunity to challenge the reliability 
of such assurances, which violated the CAT, commensurate regulations 
DQG WKH )LIWK $PHQGPHQW¶V 'ue Process Clause.191  The respondent 
government argued that judicial review was exclusively limited to 
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 Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (2012). 
179
 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30, at 10, 30, 36 (1990) (Recommendation of Advice and Consent to 
Ratification). 
180
 It is clear that this is substantially higher than that employed by the ECTHR, which merely 
UHTXLUHVD³real risk.´ Chahal v. U. K.., HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
181
 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(d) (2012). 
182
 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). 
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 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.18(c)(3), § 208.18(c)(3) (2012). 
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 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c)(1)-(2) (2012). 
185
 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.18(c)(3), § 208.18(c)(3) (2012). 
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 Khouzam v. Hogan, 529 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547±48 (M.D. Pa. 2008). 
187
 Id. at 548. 
188
 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.18(c), § 208.18(c) (2012). 
189
 Khouzam, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 551.  
190
 Id.  
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 Id. at 559. 
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consideration of the final order of removal192 and that even if the court had 
jurisdiction, the petition represented a non-justiciable political question and 
the court should not intervene in what was a matter for executive 
determination.193  
In granting a stay of removal, the Court UHMHFWHG WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V
arguments.194  Upon subsequent hearings,195 the District Court granted a 
writ of habeas corpus,196 holding that Khouzam had been denied due 
process.197  The District Court rejected the contention that assurances per 
se were not a viable option but considered that the government had failed 
to provide the applicant with notice and meaningful opportunity to be 
heard in connection with the Government's reliance upon an Egyptian 
diplomatic assurance.  Since there was no significant likelihood of removal 
in the foreseeable future,198 release was ordered under reasonable 
conditions of supervision.199 
An appeal was quickly lodged to the Third Circuit and the judgment 
was delivered in December 2008.200  While the Court of Appeals vacated 
the opinion of the District Court in respect to jurisdiction, the judgment 
still delivered a blow to the U.S. H[HFXWLYH¶VGHSRUWDWLRQVWUDWHJ\KROding 
that even if habeas corpus was circumscribed, there needed to be an 
alternative forum for judicial review201 and that the appeals court itself was 
the appropriate venue.202  The court rejected the notion that the appeal 
represented a non-justicable political question, holding that the issues 
raised were fundamentally of ³statutory, constitutional, and regulatory 
interpretation´203  In terms of the due process argument, the result of this 
                                                                                                                          
192
 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(c) (2012). 
193
 Khouzam, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 559. 
194
 Id. at 571. 
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 The appellate history of this litigation is complex and the present work does not intend to 
examine the minutiae of the government challenges and court hearings. What is recounted here notes 
the key issues raised by the final habeas corpus petition.  
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 Khouzam, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 571. 
197
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198
 The same principle applies in the context of U.K. deportations.  Detention pending deportation 
is dependent on the proceedings making satisfactory progress, and detention cannot be continued when 
proceedings have been discontinued. The requisite U.K. authorities are Chahal v. U.K., HUDOC, 
http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012) and Regina v. Governor of Durham Prison, Ex parte 
Hardial Singh, 1 W.L.R. 704, 706 (1984). Its U.S. counterpart is Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 
(2005). 
199
 Clark, 543 U.S. at 377, 386±87. 
200
  Khouzam v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 549 F.3d. 235, 235 (3d Cir. 2008).  
201
 The court avoided the circumscription by holding that the Supreme Court had established that 
a statute denying an alien the ability to test the legality of his detention through a habeas petition is 
subject to constitutional scrutiny, and may be invalidated failing such scrutiny. Therefore, since habeas 
corpus was not available, the court held that its own assessment would amount to an adequate and 
effective alternative.  Id. at 245±46. 
202
 The judgment provides a lengthy and elaborate justification in terms of the statutory power to 
MXGLFLDOO\UHYLHZRQO\WKH³ILQDORUGHU>@RIUHPRYDO´Id. at 247±49. 
203
 Id. at 251. 
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appeal is particularly significant.  The court stated that the right to due 
process had not been either prescribed or circumscribed by the relevant 
statute,204 that Khouzam had been entitled to the right, and that he had 
failed to receive any notice or hearing whatsoever.205  Damningly, the court 
held that: 
 
[B]eyond WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V EDUH DVVHUWLRQV ZH ILQG QR
record supporting the reliability of the diplomatic assurances 
that purportedly justified the termination of his deferral of 
removal.206 
 
Khouzam lacked an opportunity to make arguments on his own behalf 
or to have an individual determination made by an independent decision 
maker. The commensurate lack of process was considered by the court to 
be inherently prejudicial,207 and the court accordingly held that the order 
terminating the deferral of removal was invalid, remanding the case back 
to the BIA so due process could be given.208  In so doing, the Third Circuit 
provided key criteria that it deemed necessary to provide to a deportee 
when assurances were obtained.209  Under these principles, an alien must 
therefore receive: 
 
[N]otice and an opportunity to test the reliability of those 
assurances in a hearing;  
[T]he opportunity to present, before a neutral and 
impartial decision-maker, evidence and arguments 
challenging the reliability of diplomatic assurances proffered 
E\ WKH*RYHUQPHQWDQG WKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VFRPSOLDQFHZLWK
the relevant regulations; and 
[A]n individualized determination of the matter based on 
a record disclosed to the alien.210 
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This approach resonates with aspects of the European model and it has 
been suggested that Khouzam represents a step in that direction.211  The 
U.S. government has thus been forced to adopt an alternative strategy for 
terrorism-related deportations.  
B.  Removal of ³+igh Value´ Suspects: ³Habeas Schmabeas´212 
If the foregoing Khouzam safeguards in a non-Guantánamo context 
SURYLGHDQLQGLFDWLRQRIMXGLFLDODVVHUWLYHQHVVRQWKHH[HFXWLYH¶VIURQW-line, 
the same is also true with regard to judicial challenges to removal brought 
by Guantánamo detainees.  Guantánamo detainees have had to bridge an 
impasse of considerable magnitude in order to even assert their 
constitutional rights in the first place.213  In the context of the present 
discussion, two major issues present themselves: the practice of 
extraordinary rendition, which has attracted vitriolic worldwide 
condemnation,214 and the deliverance of Guantánamo Bay detainees to 
other countries,215 including through deportation procedure. 
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 Deeks, supra note 171, at 26. Note that this was in regard to the District Court hearing, rather 
than the appeal to the Third Circuit. 
212
 The title of an award-winning radio broadcast of This American Life, which described the 
conditions of detention at Guantánamo Bay.  Habeas Schmabeas, This American Life, CHICAGO 
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of the geographical territory of the U.S. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 72, 73 (D.D.C. 2002). This 
decision was upheld on appeal to the Court of Appeals.  Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court decision, reversing the Court of Appeals, held that the U.S. courts 
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Supreme Court held that the District Court had jurisdiction under the habeas statute. Such jurisdiction 
extends to aliens held in a territory over which the U.S. has plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, even in 
WKH DEVHQFH RI ³XOWLPDWH VRYHUHLJQW\´ Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475, 484.  Although the long-term 
consequences of Rasul were significant in terms of a marked extension of the geographical reach of 
habeas corpus, in the short-term the petitioners were required to resubmit their petitions in the District 
Court so that a hearing could take place. 
214
 A detailed review of these arguments, and indeed of extraordinary rendition generally, lies 
outside the ambit of this article. See U.N. Human Rights Council, 13th Sess., Feb. 19, 2010, 3, 70, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/13/42. 
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 1RWHWKDW WKH WHUP³UHQGLWLRQ´LVRIWHQHUURQHRXVO\XVHGWRGHQRWH³H[WUDRUGLQDU\UHQGLWLRQ´
7KHIRUPHUPHUHO\PHDQV³KDQGLQJRYHU´WKHODWWHUKDVcome to mean such transfers outside the usual 
legal framework (extra-judicial transfers) which allegedly have resulted in torture and ill-treatment.  
7KH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWDU\$VVHPEO\KDVUHIHUUHGWRWKLVDVWUDQVIHUULQJWHUURULVWVXVSHFWV³IURPRQH
state to another on civilian aircraft, outside of the scope of any legal protections, often to be handed 
RYHU WR VWDWHV ZKR FXVWRPDULO\ UHVRUW WR GHJUDGLQJ WUHDWPHQW DQG WRUWXUH    ´ EUR. PARL. ASS., 
Resolution 1507: Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State Transfers of Detainees Involving 
Council of Europe Member States, ¶7 (2006).  
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Secret renditions pose a particular problem to the current task of 
forming a DWA regime compliant with multilateral human rights norms 
and domestic constitutional guarantees.216  The numerous allegations of 
complicity in torture by the United States (and indeed the United Kingdom 
and other European governments),217 operating outside international and 
domestic laws, overshadow any relatively modest ways in which the legal 
framework can be modified to ensure appropriate constitutionalism.  This 
is a prevailing concern, yet it should not preclude an examination of ways 
in which the laws themselves can be modified so as to ensure future human 
rights compliance.  Worldwide attention, and resultant criticisms, has been 
very firmly turned towards the counter-terrorism strategy of the United 
States since 9/11.218  
Judicial challenges regarding alleged complicity in extraordinary 
rendition have been lodged;219 in the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister 
has announced an independent inquiry to examine reports of complicity in 
torture and ill-treatment.220  The practice of extraordinary rendition has 
captured the public¶VDWWHQWLRQ.221  As a response to this pressure, the U.S. 
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government has stated that the policy is not to deport where it is more 
likely than not that the individual will be subjected to torture or ill-
treatment.222  However, the government has declined to make its 
assurances public and reiterated that the decision to deport should not be 
subject to judicial intervention, which should hardly be seen as 
capitulation.223  Prior to Boumediene and Khouzam, the courts had 
produced a mismatched tapestry of uncertain precedent, providing no clear 
indication as to whether assurances should be justiciable or not;224  further 
clarification by the judiciary was direly needed.  
The three Executive Orders signed by the Obama Administration in 
January 2009 heralded a change in terms of resettlement of Guantánamo 
detainees, yet these resettlement policies have not secured closure of the 
camp.225  A report by the Special Task Force determined that the State 
Department should be responsible for evaluating assurances in all 
instances226 and that monitoring mechanisms should be established or 
improved.227  Meaningful changes have yet to be seen as a result of this 
policy.  
The removal policies and practices of the United States remain mired 
in uncertainty, and the Obama administration has been repeatedly forced to 
capitulate to the demands of a recalcitrant Congress.228  Similarly, the 
approach of other States is by no means satisfactorily established.229  There 
is no real international consensus as to the use of DWA.230  Criticisms are 
ubiquitous and further guidelines are direly needed.231  Further 
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international dialogue is essential, and through negotiations between the 
European Union and the United States it may be possible to make 
significant changes to a DWA regime for terrorist suspects.  This 
suggestion has been previously proposed but has never come to fruition at 
European or international levels.232  
 IV. ADDRESSING CRITICISMS OF ASSURANCES 
With the experience of recent European jurisprudence, there is 
considerable merit in developing MOU or a regime that promotes the use 
of individual assurances.233  The Chahal and Saadi judgments cause 
problems for governments in terms of certainty of human rights 
compliance,234 and assurances have attracted fierce criticism from 
academics235 and NGOs.236  The Committee Against Torture has expressed 
concern regarding the U.K. use of assurances.237  Before suggestions for 
change can be proposed, it is first necessary to address the detail of these 
varied, complex, and overlapping criticisms.  Such criticisms will be 
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considered discretely, but this is an artificial exercise and a holistic view of 
the arguments should ultimately be taken.238 
A.  Assurances Undermine the Jus Cogens Nature of the Prohibition of 
Torture, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment 
The UN Commission on Human Rights has asserted that  ³the mere 
fact that such assurances are sought is arguably a tacit admission by the 
sending State that the transferred person is indeed at risk of being tortured 
or ill- treated´239 and the UN Commissioner has stated that ³[g]iven the 
absolute obligation of States not to expose any person to the danger of 
torture by way of extradition, expulsion, deportation or other transfer, 
diplomatic assurances should not be used to circumvent the non-
refoulement obligation.´240  There appears to be increasingly popular, 
political, and judicial willingness to discuss possible exceptions to the 
prohibition.241  In a U.K. context, this could be said to be reflective of the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V VXFFHVVLYH DWWHPSWV WR OLPLW RU UHYHUVH Chahal in order to 
allow the State to engage in a risk balancing exercise.242  Similarly, the 
approach of the United States to require a ³PRUH OLNHO\ WKDQ QRW´ 
possibility of torture or ill-treatment to be established ³more likely than 
not´ does not appear to represent an affirmation of the jus cogens 
doctrine.243  Perhaps even more significantly, the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Suresh v Canada244 caused consternation245 when it declared that a 
EDODQFLQJ DFW ZDV DSSURSULDWH EHWZHHQ WKH 6WDWH¶V JHQXLQH LQWHUHVW LQ
combating terrorism and protecting public security, against a constitutional 
commitment to liberty and fair process.246  The Court iterated that usually 
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the balance will ³come down against expelling a person to face torture 
elsewhere´247 but did not conclude that the non-refoulement obligation had 
attained jus cogens status.248  Instead, the Court considered that the ³better 
view´ was that international law rejects deportation to torture, even where 
national security interests are at stake.249  The Court continued to state that 
³[w]e do not exclude the possibility that in exceptional circumstances, 
deportation to face torture might be justified´250  This position was 
condemned internationally,251 yet it nonetheless indicates an increased 
willingness to overlook the jus cogens nature of the prohibition.  
A further tenet to this first criticism relates to the fact that there are 
documented instances in which assurances have been given and individuals 
have allegedly been subjected to torture upon their return.252  These have 
been seized on by critics of the regime253 and used to undermine its jus 
cogens attribute; if even one assurance has been broken, it could be argued 
that assurances do not provide a reliable mechanism for preventing ill-
treatment or torture.  There is a distinct tension as to how these two 
principles can be reconciled.  On the one hand, it is argued that a State 
which recognizes that assurances have been breached and yet persists in 
their creation is not embracing the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of 
torture, while on the other hand, it is contended that assurances themselves 
are designed to ensure that a State complies with its international 
obligations.254  These principles appear to be mutually exclusive. 
 
The reason that these principles seem irreconcilable is as much due to 
political rhetoric as it is with legal norms.  Condemnation of torture and ill-
treatment by the State itself or its agents is prohibited jus cogens erga 
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omnes.255  By definition, this means that the prohibition imposes 
obligations towards all members of the international community, whether 
or not they have ratified the relevant convention.256  NGOs are 
understandably opposed to any notion of the prohibition of torture 
attracting a lesser degree of international protection,257 and a departure 
from this stance would be abhorrent.258  The jus cogens status of the non-
refoulement obligation, however, that is far less certain. NGOs have 
stressed that it is so.259  Others have postulated that ³due to the absolute 
nature of the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, 
formal assurances cannot be sufficient to permit expulsions where a risk is 
nonetheless considered to remain´260  The opinion of academics generally 
appears to be that non-refoulement is emerging as a new jus cogens 
norm,261 if it has not already assumed that status,262 but this is by no means 
settled.  
The Vienna Convention defines a ³peremptory norm,´ or jus cogens 
norm, as a ³norm accepted and recognized by the international community 
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international 
law having the same character´263  A treaty which conflicts with such a 
norm is void.264  Peremptory norms are unconditional in character,265 link 
the entire international community, and cannot be bilaterally limited.266 
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While Orakhelashvili accepts that norms cannot be differentiated, it is 
suggested that the absolute character of such a norm relates not to its scope 
but to its normative quality.267  Torture may be prohibited absolutely, but 
the extent of the activity that comprises torture is open to interpretation.268   
It has been suggested that non-refoulement has a similar basis269 and has 
been ³firmly established´ as a peremptory norm.270  The fact that the non-
refoulement obligation is un-derogable provides strong evidence, but not 
conclusive proof, that it constitutes a peremptory norm.271 
Drawing on these principles, Farmer argues that the status of non-
refoulement has now been widely accepted as a peremptory norm,272 citing 
the advisory opinions of the United Nations High Commission on 
Refugees as affirmation of the point.273  It has been contended that a jus 
cogens norm has been accepted by the international community as a whole 
and that no derogation is permitted274 but that rigorous conformity is not 
required in order for a jus cogens norm to emerge.275  If the non-
refoulement obligation is jus cogens, States cannot transgress from it in 
any way,276 implying that States cannot enact legislation that may result in 
refoulement.277 
The less popular view amongst scholars is that it is uncertain whether 
the non-refoulement obligation has yet attained jus cogens status.278  It has 
been argued that little is ³likely to be achieved´ by regarding the non-
refoulement principle as peremptory.279  This view has been criticized280 
since it implies that if the principle is not peremptory.  ³States will be able 
to override it by treaties in which they will provide for the legality of the 
return of persons to the countries where serious violations of human rights 
may be faced´281  This criticism is self-defeating on the basis of its two 
central tenets.  First, there is some latitude in terms of the nature of the ill-
treatment itself vis-à-vis the distinction between ill-treatment and 
torture.282  Next, there is a varying degree of risk required, or a varying 
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standard of proof, before the non-refoulement obligation is triggered.283 
It is possible to draw a distinction between the principle of non-
refoulement as it applies under the Refugee Convention and as it applies 
under other international documents, including CAT.284  Following this 
reasoning,285 the argument that non-refoulement has acquired jus cogens 
status is ³less than convincing,´286 since such a conclusion would suggest 
that ³no exceptions would be considered under any circumstance´287 and 
this is clearly not the case. 288  There remain exceptions to the non-
refoulement principle in the context of the Refugee Convention,289 but 
there are also significant differences in interpretation of the obligation 
itself.  Article 3 of CAT applies only to torture, not to other ill-treatment, 
and its interpretation by the ECtHR lacks universal application.290  In order 
for treatment to be characterized as torture, the ECtHR will assess its 
degree of severity,291 yet Article 3 of CAT has attracted no such 
interpretive guidance.292  It has been seen that the ECtHR considered that 
ill-treatment other than torture that is nonetheless contrary to Article 3 
ECHR will prevent removal,293 which is not the case under CAT.294  
Courts have accepted that a degree of risk is permissible before the 
non-refoulement obligation is triggered, which in itself could appear to 
contradict the contention that it has jus cogens status.  It is instructive to 
note that NGO guidance and analysis tends to overlook the risk assessment 
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supra note 294. 
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criterion;295  it is bewildering that the courts have not seen such a 
contradiction.296  In terms of the standard of proof required before the non-
refoulement obligation is triggered, there is considerable variation in 
practice.297  The European jurisprudence requires that there is the absence 
of a real risk of torture or ill-treatment, while the U.S. approach is 
predicated on a considerably higher standard, effectively the equivalent of 
the balance of probabilities.298  An alternative standard of ³real and 
substantial risk´299 has also been proposed.  
Despite such variance, the ECtHR has indicated that it accepts that 
assurances have the potential to satisfy the demands of Article 3 ECHR,300 
and there have been no ripples of dissent from the Supreme Courts of 
comparable jurisdictions in the United States, Canada or Australia.301  It is 
contended that the way in which the non-refoulement obligation has been 
applied, therefore, shows exactly the kind of ³differentialism´ that cannot 
be representative of a peremptory norm.302  Allied to this are other 
difficulties; the UDLVRQ G¶HWUH of the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
Against Torture (OPCAT) is to allow for monitoring to ensure that 
refoulement does not occur.303  OPCAT naturally lends little credence to 
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the argument that non-refoulement is jus cogens, given the comparatively 
low extent of international ratification,304 and the fact that the protocol is 
optional.305  
These issues will no doubt continue to be disputed by jurists.  Most 
scholars have argued that the principle of non-refoulement has jus cogens 
status306 and would contend that the ³existence of exceptions to the 
principle of non-refoulement indicate the boundaries of discretion as 
opposed to any fundamental objections to the principle itself.´307  Yet there 
is a more obvious impediment to non-refoulement gaining preemptory 
status.  Extraordinary rendition has been castigated as an extra-judicial tool 
that has resulted in torture and ill-treatment.308  Complicity in its practice 
has been well documented in States across the world,309 presenting an 
impasse of considerable magnitude to those who would seek to argue for 
the current peremptory nature of non-refoulement.310  It is difficult to 
maintain the defense that such practices provide confirmation of the jus 
cogens rule; there must come a point when a plethora of exceptions serve 
to terminally undermine it.311 
The analysis of this part has identified several possibilities.  First, the 
non-refoulement obligation may be classified as jus cogens.312  Accepting 
this in principle does not preclude the use of assurances, since it is argued 
that they have the potential to comply with the obligation. 313  Some have 
suggested that the use of assurances adds a layer of protection above that 
offered by jus cogens.314  Second, non-refoulement may be classified as jus 
cogens (as scholars and NGOs would advocate), but by recognizing the 
need and negotiating for assurances, the Refugee Commission has 
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 Only 74 states have either signed or ratified OPCAT, and of those, only 54 have ratified.  See 
generally id.  
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argued315 that recognition is given to the existence of the peremptory norm 
by these States.316  This argument may appear counterintuitive,317 but 
many, including the U.K. government, have accepted it.318  The third 
possibility is that the non-refoulement obligation has not yet fully ascended 
to jus cogens status, since there has been inconsistent observation of the 
norm in practice and since there are myriad examples of instances in which 
it has been ignored.  Perhaps this is currently the most likely possibility, 
even if it is the least politically palatable. 
Taking these arguments to their logical conclusion, what is needed is 
further international consensus as to the standard of protection afforded by 
the non-refoulement principle.  The obligation should be finally allowed to 
attain its status as a peremptory norm, yet this can only meaningfully be 
achieved when international agreement has been reached as to its 
definition.  It should be possible to redefine non-refoulement obligation 
itself, from the current bar where there are ³substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture´319 to 
something that is universally interpreted.320  There could be clear 
identification of the fact that the exceptions to the Refugee Convention 
have been trumped by this emerging norm.  Considerable pressure should 
be put on States to ratify OPCAT; the likelihood of this being achieved 
will increase when an end is put to extraordinary rendition.  The legal and 
political difficulties in reaching an agreement on such a definition are 
significant, and indeed may be insurmountable.321  Nonetheless, this should 
not prevent States from attempting to reach some acceptable agreement. 
Removal of an individual to a State to face torture is prohibited.322  
However, the legal reality is that not all risk of torture must be eliminated 
before a deportation can be said to comply with the non-refoulement 
obligation.323  This article rejects the contention that assurances cannot be 
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used without compromising international obligations around the 
prohibition of torture.  Instead, what is proposed is a procedure for 
assurances that can be adopted in order to reduce this risk to an acceptable 
level.  The standards required of such an assurance model can be 
particularly rigorous.324 
B.  Non-Legally Binding Assurances are Not Effective (or Reliable) Since 
They May Not Be Observed by States 
There have been criticisms that assurances, due to their political or 
quasi-legal nature, are not legally enforceable325 and therefore do not offer 
adequate protection.  Larsaeus gives a comprehensive account of the 
arguments around international enforceability and the difference between 
legally binding treaties and non-enforceable political promises.326  It is 
commonly understood that assurances are legally binding under 
international law if they amount to treaties.327  Some academics have 
postulated that all MOU are treaties and therefore binding,328 while others 
are not so certain.329  It has been contended that in order to be effective, 
assurances should be legally binding.330  NGOs such as Human Rights 
Watch have disputed the efficacy of mere political assurances, perhaps 
because there are no competitive market forces at play on an international 
stage, leading the costs of noncompliance to be either low or 
nonexistent.331  From an analysis of the language of the U.K. assurances, 
there is broad agreement that they are not intended to be legally binding.332  
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The U.K. government has not argued that the MOU that are currently in 
place have full legal force.333  This does not necessarily mean that 
assurances are ineffective.334 
Accepting that U.K. MOUs are not intended to confer binding 
international legal principles on the sending or receiving State, the reliance 
on assurances takes place at a level over and above that attained by the 
relevant international obligations under CAT.335  There are multiple 
problems with this contention.  First, it assumes that international 
obligations viz non-refoulement under CAT may be discharged without 
resorting to the use of assurances.  The European jurisprudence has shown 
this to be questionable, if not unlikely.  Second, it suggests that the 
assurances currently used by the United Kingdom comply with the non-
refoulement obligation.  Although the House of Lords has been satisfied,336 
even a more definitive ECtHR ruling has not finally settled the issue.337  
Third, it does not follow that a similar approach would be adopted by 
States interpreting CAT on an international stage, given the very different 
standards of protection conferred by the respective Conventions.338  Rather 
than accepting that U.K. assurances offer protection above that available 
multilaterally, a more pertinent question would be whether there are 
appropriate enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure compliance. 
1.  Enforcement 
One of the central criticisms regarding the use of assurances, and their 
corresponding ineffectiveness, is in relation to the lack of adequate 
enforcement mechanisms.339  There is considerable evidence to suggest 
that States which had provided assurances still had a reputation for ill-
treatment and/or torture.340  The legal value of assurances is questionable, 
and their justiciability on an international stage is even more so.341  
Nonetheless, an assurance that lacks legal enforceability is not necessarily 
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rendered redundant.342  It is important to differentiate between legal 
enforcement and enforcement by other means, including political sanctions 
or other ramifications in the case of breach.343 
Central to the U.K. JRYHUQPHQW¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHSRWHQWLDOYDOXHRI
assurances is the strategy of placing assurances at the heart of a bilateral 
relationship between States.344  With regard to the argument that MOUs are 
invariably created with States with questionable human rights records and 
that such States would not comply with non-legally binding rules, Jones 
responds by noting that compliance by such States will: 
 
[D]epend less on the legal status of a commitment and more 
on reasons and incentives they have to comply. Failure to 
comply with formal political commitments in an MOU or 
similar international instrument can do serious damage to 
diplomatic relations between the signatory States.345 
 
In the United Kingdom, SIAC continues to scrutinize assurances on a 
case-by-case basis,346 and it may be thought that there is considerable force 
LQ-RQHV¶DUJXPHQWWKDWZLWKVXFKIDFWXDOGHWHUPLQDWLRQVDVWRDVVXUDQFHV¶
reliability347 and with the appropriate scrutiny, right of appeal, and political 
and legal checks, assurances can be considered reliable safeguards.348  
SIAC has formed the opinion that bilateral agreements do provide 
substantial protection against potential breaches, suggesting that the 
Commission considers, similarly to Larsaeus,349 that such agreements offer 
protection over the existing multilateral rights protection stemming from 
international law.350  The ECtHR has added further support to this 
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contention.351 
There is one criterion that must be considered on an international level 
before this can be achieved.  Much has been said of the ³ELODWHUDO
UHODWLRQVKLS´ needed between the sending and receiving States.352  
However, in many situations one party to a removal is subordinate to 
another.353  A consistent approach internationally, requiring the existence 
of such bilateral relationships over and above the multilateral framework, 
is impossible.  Political promises are only effective where there is a 
political sanction for breach; the complex social, political, and economic 
factors at play in an international arena preclude the formation of a wholly 
uniform rubric.354  Once a successful bi-lateral relationship can be shown, 
and provided the nature of this relationship adds a sufficient degree of 
political enforceability, an assurance may be upheld.355  A tribunal such as 
SIAC, together with a robust appeals procedure, should be able to carry out 
this exercise and uphold an assurance only where its effectiveness has been 
established.356  SIAC has exposed assurances to intensive scrutiny in 
numerous cases.357  
The effectiveness of assurances should therefore be questioned by an 
independent assessment of the political will and overall likelihood of a 
breach by either State.  Thus enforceability in international terms has a 
different meaning than strictly legal enforceability; a more fitting 
international term may be compliance,358 which must be justiciable. 
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Sweden and Egypt and between the United States and Syria.  Id. ¶ 496±497. 
355
 See id. DW>@5%Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8.+/>@4DWDGDY
UK, HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
356
 K. Jones, supra note 27, at 186. 
357
 Numerous SIAC decisions are referred to in the following analysis.  Outcomes 2007 Onwards, 
Tribunals Judiciary of England and Wales, http://www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/outcomes2007onwards. 
htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2012). 
358
 ³>:@KLOVWLWLVWUXHWKDWWKHUHDUHQRVSHFLILFVDQFWLRQVIRUEUHDFKHVDQGWKH028LVFHUWDLQO\
QRWOHJDOO\HQIRUFHDEOHWKHUHDUHVRXQGUHDVRQVZK\-RUGDQZRXOGFRPSO\DQGVHHNWRDYRLGEUHDFKHV´
4DWDGDY6HF¶\RI6WDWH IRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W, [2007] UKSIAC 15/2005 [507]. 
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Observing these differences, Larsaeus analyzes the ways in which 
international relations may ensure compliance with assurances, discussing 
the use of both incentives and threats as a means to facilitate such 
compliance.359  Larsaeus also discusses the relevance of the degree of trust 
between sending and receiving States.360  These considerations will clearly 
vary on a case-by-case basis and will be determined by a variety of factors 
that govern the political relationship between the two States.  
2.  A Doctrine of Compliance 
In order to ensure compliance, much will depend on the relationship 
between the sending and receiving State in terms of political will, trust, 
incentives, and threats.361  It is instructive to examine relevant SIAC cases 
in which assurances have been challenged in order to study how weight has 
been given to the likelihood of compliance through an examination of the 
bilateral relationship.  7KH ³strength, duration and depth´362 of such a 
bilateral relationship are key factors.  There is a requirement for a ³sound 
objective basis for believing that the assurances would be fulfilled´363  As 
Lord Phillips has stated, this requires a ³settled political will to fulfill the 
assurances allied to an objective national interest in doing so.´364  Jones 
lists pertinent examples as to the approach of the U.K. government and 
SIAC, addressing these briefly in order to see the various ways in which 
compliance may be facilitated and to demonstrate their relative 
advantages.365 
 
First, there should be discussions between Heads of State or 
governments.  This criterion is particularly important where there is a risk 
                                                                                                                          
359
 Larsaeus, supra note 313, at 23. 
360
 Id. at 26±27.  
361
 SIAC has demonstrated the importance of trust between the British Government and, for 
example, the Algerian Authorities.  See 7 Y 6HF¶\ RI 6WDWH IRU WKH +RPH 'HS¶W >@ 8.6,$&
 >@ 7KLV FRXOG EH FRQWUDVWHG ZLWK WKH 8. JRYHUQPHQW¶V UHOLDQFH RQ WUXVW LQ WKH /LE\DQ
regime; SIAC held that particular assurance was insufficient.  See ''DQG$6Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH
+RPH'HS¶W>@8.6,$&DQG>@see also 4DWDGDY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH
'HS¶W, [2007] UKSIAC 15/2005, [312]. 
  
362
 4DWDGD Y 6HF¶\ RI 6WDWH IRU WKH +RPH 'HS¶W, [2007] UKSIAC 15/2005, [496]; see also 
4DWDGD Y 8. +8'2& KWWSZZZHFKUFRHLQW ODVW YLVLWHG 1RY    ³7KH &RXUW VKDUHV
6,$&¶VYLHZQRWPHUHO\WKDWWKHUHZRXOGEHDUHDODQGVWURQJLQFHQWLYHLQWKHSUHVHQWFDVHIRU Jordan 
to avoid being seen to break its word but that the support for the MOU at the highest levels in Jordan 
would significantly reduce the risk that senior members of the GID, who had participated in the 
negotiation of the MOU, would tolerate non-compliDQFHZLWKLWVWHUPV´Id. 
363
  5%Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8+./>@DSSHDOWDNHQIURP>@
EWCA (Civ) 808).  (Lord Phillips, citing the test adopted by Justice Mitting of SIAC).  
364
 Id. 
365
 K. Jones, supra note 27, at 187.  Note thaW -RQHV¶ DFFRXQW OLVWV VL[ EXW WKHVH KDYH EHHQ
FRPELQHGLQWRIRXUIRUWKHVDNHRIFODULW\-RQHV¶GLVFXVVLRQLVRIWKHVWHSVWKDWDUHWDNHQE\WKH8.
government, as opposed to suggestions for how to ensure compliance. SIAC is the arbiter in that case. 
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of breach by the security services or other agents of a receiving State.366  
By invoking a top-down approach, a clear message is sent to agents of the 
receiving State that a breach of the assurance will not be tolerated.  Senior 
level discussions were advocated in the U.S. case of Khouzam v Ashcroft, 
where the court held that ³[t]he regulations require more than the mere 
forwarding of diplomatic assurances obtained by the State Department.  
They require consultation at the highest levels of the Departments of State 
and Homeland Security´367  While the actions of uncontrollable security 
services or other personnel will remain a prevailing concern and represent 
a key consideration when it comes to the assessment of an assurance by the 
relevant tribunal,368 adopting such an approach should help to minimize 
this risk.369 
Second, there should be detailed discussions at both the ministerial and 
operational level as to the practical meanings of such assurances;370 in this 
way, the literal ³black letter´ of the assurances themselves is supplemented 
by myriad guarantees and understandings that form part of the 
agreement.371  This ensures that the existence of black letter promises does 
not result in a restrictive interpretation being placed on specific 
guarantees.372  Linked to this should be a requirement to carry out a 
detailed inquiry as to what will happen to a deportee upon their return, 
                                                                                                                          
366
 ³,QHYDOXDWLQJDVVXUDQFHVE\D IRUHLJQJRYHUQPHQW WKH0LQLVWHUPD\DOVRZLVK WR WDNH LQWR
DFFRXQWWKHKXPDQULJKWVUHFRUGRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWJLYLQJWKHDVVXUDQFHVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHFRUGLQ
complying with its assurances, and the capacity of the government to fulfill the assurances, particularly 
ZKHUHWKHUH LVGRXEWDERXW WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDELOLW\ WRFRQWURO LWV VHFXULW\ IRUFHV´6XUHVKY. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 SCR 3, [125]; see Chahal v. U.K., HUDOC, 
http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
367
 Khouzam v. Hogan, 529 F. Supp. 2d 543, 558 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (emphasis in original). 
368
 See, e.g.4-Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8.6,$&>@7KHQRWLFH
WDNHQE\6,$&RIDQ³LVRODWHGLQFLGHQW´LQ$OJHULDLQZKLFKEHWZHHQ thirty and eighty prisoners were 
stripped naked, beaten, kicked, beaten and threatened with sexual abuse.  Id. 
369
 In the context of the Jordan assurances, see, e.g., 2WKPDQ Y 6HF¶\ RI 6WDWH IRU WKH +RPH
'HS¶W>@(:&$&LY>@6,$&FRQVLGHUHGWKHDFWLRQVRI³TXLWHVHQLRU´RIILFHUVZKRKDG
VDQFWLRQHG RU WXUQHG D EOLQG H\H WR WRUWXUH EXW KHOG WKDW WKLV ZDV PLWLJDWHG E\ WKH .LQJ¶V SROLWLFDO
power and prestige.  Id. 
370
 This approach may be particularly important when dealing with states which are reluctant to  
³JR EH\RQG WKDW ZKLFK ZDV VWULFWO\ DJUHHG WR LQLWLDOO\.´  See 6LKDOL Y 6HF¶\ RI 6WDWH IRU WKH +RPH
'HS¶W>@8.6,$&>@VXPPDUL]LQJFRPPHQWVLQUHVSHFWRIWKH$OJHULDQSURPLVHVRI 
Mr. Layden, the Special Representative of the DWA regime for the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office). 
371
 While this would therefore appear to question the validity of the Algerian assurances, it is 
submitted below that these already should fall below the required standard due to the absence of 
independent monitoring (at least until OPCAT is ratified). 
372
 Or, LQWKHZRUGVRI6,$&³WKHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHYDOXHDQGHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIDVVXUDQFHVLVOHVVD
matter of their text . . . and more a matter of the domestic political forces which animate a government 
and of the diplomatic and other pressures which may impel its performance of its obligations, or lead to 
TXLFNGLVFRYHU\DQGUHGUHVVIRUDQ\EUHDFK´''DQG$6Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@
8.6,$&  DQG >@  ³>7@KHSROLWLFDO UHDOLWLHV LQ D FRXQWU\ PDWWHU UDWKHUPRUH WKDQ WKH
precise tHUPLQRORJ\RIWKHDVVXUDQFHV´ 2WKPDQY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@(:&$
(Civ) 290, [495]. 
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which will help to remove any potential DPELJXLW\ DV WR D GHSRUWHH¶V
treatment immediately on their return arguably the time in which a 
deportee is most at risk.373  There is a clear need for justiciability of these 
issues. 
The third criterion is arguably the most important; assurances should 
be placed ³at the heart of a bilateral relationship´ so as to reinforce the 
severity of the consequences of a breach.374  This draws on the issues 
identified above in relation to incentives and sanctions, which may be trade 
related or otherwise political in nature.375  It is important that there is an 
independent arbiter ensuring that the issues are justiciable.376  One example 
would be the assurances provided by Algeria, upheld by SIAC and the 
House of Lords, partially due to the fact that Algeria wished to become a 
normally functioning civil society; breaching solemn political promises 
would be incompatible with such an aim.377  
Fourth, the political relationship and potential ramifications of 
deportation to the individual should be considered.378  In some instances, 
the removal of individuals has attracted media scrutiny and captured the 
public interest;379 this may reduce the likelihood of a breach.  There may 
also be accounts of treatment of previous deportees or detainees, which 
will naturally influence any decision.380 
                                                                                                                          
373
 See, e.g., OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, The Global Campaign for Pretrial Justice, Pretrial 
Detention and Torture: Why Pretrial Detainees Face the Greatest Risk (2010), http://www. 
opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/summary-pretrial-detention-torture.20100409.pdf. 
374
 4DWDGDY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W, [2007] UKSIAC 15/2005, [278, 280]. 
375
 For reasons of diplomatic relations and national security, it is often difficult to categorize the 
ways in which such sanctions could be implemented; SIAC will consider the availability of such 
sanctions in a closed session if necessary, and such considerations will inform its overall judgment. For 
6,$&¶s assessment of the Jordan assurances, see, e.g.99Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@
UKSIAC 59/2006, [30]. 
376
 Such as the SIAC in the United Kingdom, see infra text accompanying notes 373±77. 
377
 The court noted that very considerable efforts have been made at the highest political levels on 
both sides to strengthen these ties.  Y, %% DQG 8 Y 6HF¶\ RI 6WDWH IRU WKH +RPH 'HS¶W >@
UKSIAC 39/2005, [18]. 
378
 This was raised by Abu Qatada in respect of deportation to Jordan.  Qatada argued that the fact 
that his high profile placed him at higher risk of ill-WUHDWPHQWLQ-RUGDQWKHFRXUWFRQVLGHUHG³LWPRUH
OLNHO\ WKDW WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V KLJK SURILOH ZLOO PDNH WKH -RUGDQLDQ DXWKRULWLHV FDUHIXO WR HQVXre he is 
properly treated; the Jordanian Government is no doubt aware that not only would ill-treatment have 
serious consequences for its bilateral relationship with the United Kingdom, it would also cause 
LQWHUQDWLRQDORXWUDJH´4DWDGDY8.+8'2&KWWp;//www.echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
379
 2WKPDQY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@(:&$&LY7 [355-
56]; but see 1DVHHUHWDOY6HF¶\RIWKH6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8.6,$& 77/80/81/82/83/09 
[34] (accepting tKDW ³DOWKRXJK SXEOLFLW\ FDQ SURYLGH D PHDVXUH RI SURWHFWLRQ IRU WKRVH VXVSHFWHG RI
WHUURULVPLWLVQRJXDUDQWHHRIWKHLUVDIHW\´ 
380
 ³3ROLWLFDOZLOODSDUWLWVHHPVWRXVWKDWWKHEHVWLQGLFDWRURIZKHWKHUWKHVHDVVXUDQFHVZLOOEH
fulfilled is the experieQFHRIWKRVHZKRKDYHEHHQUHWXUQHGWR$OJHULD´6LKDOLY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH
+RPH'HS¶W>@8.6,$&>@6,$&FRPSDUHG6LKDOL¶VSRWHQWLDOWUHDWPHQWXSRQUHWXUQWR
that of other deportees whom were higher in terms of threat hierarchy. In particular, see id. ¶ 52±64 
(discussing the treatment of every deportee to Algeria and relevant detainee).  See also 8Y6HF¶\RI
WKH6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8.6,$& SC/32/2005 [37]. 
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All of the abovementioned criteria have their place in ensuring an 
effective and broadly rights-compliant DWA regime, and the recent 
ECtHR judgment in Qatada has crystallized some eleven principles that no 
doubt will inform efforts of the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) to 
conclude assurances that will be capable of withstanding future judicial 
scrutiny.381  These criteria may be summarized as: whether the assurances 
have been disclosed to the court, whether the assurances are specific or 
vague, who has given and received the assurances and whether they are 
binding, the nature of the bilateral relationship between the sending and 
UHFHLYLQJ 6WDWH LQFOXGLQJ WKH 6WDWH¶V SUHYLRXV UHFRUG LQ DELGLQJ E\
assurances, the requirement for objective verification of compliance with 
assurances, whether there is an effective system of protection against 
torture in the receiving State, whether the applicant has previously been 
subject to ill-treatment in the receiving State, and whether the reliability of 
the assurances has been examined by the domestic courts of the sending 
State.382 
Other measures could be implemented at an international level in order 
to ensure greater compliance or enforcement.  Once a bilateral relationship 
is established, transparency at an international level will alleviate some of 
the concerns regarding secrecy.383  Of real significance are the multiple 
NGO reports facilitating appropriate international scrutiny.384  The 
publication of monitoring reports,385 together with mandatory reporting to 
the Committee Against Torture on the use of assurances, will help to 
ensure compliance in such a manner.  This is already a requirement of 
those States that have ratified OPCAT.386 Much could be said for 
increasing the size of the Committee Against Torture and to 
correspondingly require States to submit reports subject to full public and 
NGO scrutiny, on an annual basis.  There is a considerable time lag evident 
between recommendations of the Committee and the subsequent response 
and/or remedial action of the concerned State.387  Such time lag may be 
reduced by an implementation of these measures. 
                                                                                                                          
381
 See generally Qatada v. UK [HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012)]. 
382
 Id. at [189]. 
383
 Noll, supra note 329, at 125. 
384
 See $PQHVW\,QW¶Osupra note 237, at 5±7. 
385
 States are currently required to submit a report to the Committee Against Torture one year 
after acceding to the Convention and then at 4-yearly intervals. The Committee against Torture adopted 
a new optional reporting procedure, consisting of a list of issues to which states are required to respond. 
U.N. Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, Nov. 6, 2006±Nov. 24, 2006, Apr. 30, 2007-May 18, 2007, 
U.N. Doc. A/62/44; GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 44 (2007). 
386
 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 18, 2002, U.N. Doc A/RES/57/199; GAOR, 57th Sess., (2003).  As to 
the significance of OPCAT in a monitoring context, see supra text accompanying notes 370±72.  
387
 The four-yearly requirement was not observed either by the United States or the United 
Kingdom. The last report of the United States was due in 2001 and submitted in 2005, completed in 
2006; the last report of the United Kingdom was due January 2002 and submitted November 2003.  
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Each of the foregoing suggestions may help ensure greater compliance 
with assurances.  From the jurisprudence of the U.K. courts and the 
ECtHR, it is clear that the removal should be justiciable.  An appropriate 
tribunal should have the power to scrutinize the assurance, rather than 
simply afford unfettered discretion to the executive, which is contrary to 
the current practice of the U.S. government.  It is therefore necessary to 
consider the ways in which this may be implemented. 
3.  Justiciability: Iura Novat Curia 
The refusal of the U.S. government to allow the courts to intervene in 
these matters echoes U.K. concern voiced in 1971 during passage of the 
Immigration Act.388   Yet the experience of the United Kingdom since that 
time has shown that the courts have discharged their function remarkably 
well.389  In terms of the composition and function of an appropriate 
tribunal, some lessons may be drawn from SIAC in the United Kingdom.  
Clearly there is tension between the requirement to protect national 
security when dealing with sensitive terrorism-related issues with the 
obligation to ensure secrecy in some cases to protect diplomatic relations 
with other States.390 
The use of a DWA regime should be clearly prescribed by the legal 
system in a concerned State.391  Lessons may be drawn from the German 
system, which implements a formal administrative procedure to regulate 
the use of assurances.392  Establishing an assurance regime on a statutory 
footing would have numerous advantages in terms of clarity and 
justiciability, whilst encouraging further debate during its legislative 
passage.393  A tribunal responsible for judicial oversight of a DWA regime 
must be adept at analyzing national security matters within a specific legal 
framework, as has been emphasized by the House of Lords: 
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  ³:KHWKHUDQ LQGLYLGXDO¶VSUHVHQFH LQ WKLVFRXQWU\ LVDGDQJHU WR WKLVFRXQWU\ LVQRWD OHJDO
decision. It is not a justiciable issue or a matter of law; it is a matter of judgment. Judgment should be 
exercised by the Government, subject to the House of Commons, and not by a tribunal which is not 
XQGHUWKHFRQWURORIWKH+RXVH´PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1971) 392 (U.K.). 
389
 For a comprehensive historical account of deportation since the 1971 Act, see Bradley and 
Ewing, supra note 30, at 451±52. 
390
 These issues were considered by the ECtHR in Chahal, with the ECtHR criticizing the 
mechanisms for review.  Chahal v. U.K., [HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Oct., 12, 
2012)]. These criticisms led to the creation of SIAC. 
391
 U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, 
Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee against Torture, Jul. 25, 2006, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/USA/CO/2, GAOR, 36th Sess., (2006) at [22]. 
392
 Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt, 30 October 2009 (GMBl 42-61, S 877ff) §§ 60(2), (3), and (7) 
respectively. 
393
 Id. at 60(2), (3), and (7).  
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This is an expert tribunal charged with administering a 
FRPSOH[ DUHD RI ODZ LQ FKDOOHQJLQJ FLUFXPVWDQFHV « WKH
ordinary courts should approach appeals from [such 
WULEXQDOV@ « ZLWK DQ DSSURSULDWH GHJUHH RI caution; it is 
probable that in understanding and applying the law in their 
specialized field the tribunal will have got it right. 394 
 
SIAC holds closed hearings and gives closed judgments where 
appropriate, and it has been seen that the tribunal must be capable of 
assessing the political situation in the sending and receiving States.395  An 
examination of this role lies outside the ambit of this article; the United 
States would benefit from an analysis of the Commission concerning the 
way in which it manages the sensitive issues at play in this area, since 
judicial oversight in a U.S. context has been problematic.396 
One area in which the U.K. system is potentially deficient is the 
absence of an effective appeals route; once SIAC has reached a decision, 
appellate court scrutiny is limited.397  The ECtHR in Chahal has 
established that the test as to whether there is a ³real risk´ that a deportee 
would be subject to ill-treatment is a matter of fact that will turn on the 
individual circumstances of the case,398 and the United Kingdom has 
stipulated that an appeal can only be brought on  questions of law.399  As 
Lord Hoffmann has stated, ³[t]he findings of SIAC on safety on return are 
therefore open to challenge only if no reasonable tribunal could have 
reached such a conclusion on the evidence´400  The House of Lords could 
perhaps have ruled that in determining an appeal, scrutiny was required of 
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 See the approach of Lord Phillips in RB5%Y6HF¶\RI6WDWH IRU WKH+RPH'HS¶W >@
UHKL 10, [101, 118, 169, 218-19, 223, 232] (appeal taken from [2007] EWCA Civ 808) (citing 
comments made by Baroness Hale, in the context of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal in AH 
6XGDQY6HF¶\RIWKH6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W81+&5LQWHUYHQLQJ>@8.+/>@. 
395
 Qatada v. U.K., [HUDOC, http.www.echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012)].  The role of 
SIAC in assessing the viability of assurances was effectively vindicated by the ECtHR, which 
FRQVLGHUHGWKDW6,$&ZDVD³IXOO\LQGHSHQGHQWFRXUW´ZLWKWKHSRZHUWRFRQGXFWD³IXOOPHULWVUHYLHZ´
of the deportation, including the power to quash the deportation order.  Id. 
396
 For an examination of which, see Deeks, supra note 172, at 74±79. The suggestion that the 
U.S. policy should be different (i.e. not establish full judiciaOUHYLHZLQOLJKWRIWKH³sense within the 
Executive Branch that the U.S. role in the world may require a greater degree of discretion and 
confidentiality than that UHTXLUHGE\RXU:HVWHUQDOOLHV´ is particularly pertinent.  Id. 
397
 See 5%Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8.+/>±73] (Lord Phillips).   
398
 ³7KHUHLs in my opinion nothing in the subsequent jurisprudence of the ECHR to change the 
TXHVWLRQRU WR FRQYHUW LW LQWR D TXHVWLRQRI ODZ´ 5% Y 6HF¶\ RI 6WDWH IRU WKH +RPH 'HS¶W >@
UHKL 10, [185] (Lord Hoffmann). See id. /RUG+RSH³7KHUHLVQRWKLQg in Convention law or 
section 6(1) of the [Human Rights] Act that requires SIAC's findings of fact on these issues, contrary to 
WKLVSURYLVLRQWREHUHRSHQHGRQDSSHDO´ 
399
 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act, 1997, c. 68, § 7(1) (Eng.). 
400
 RB v. 6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8+./ [191] (Lord Hoffmann). 
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the factual matrix itself, but it declined to do so.401  The current position is 
that SIAC conducts a detailed fact-based analysis and reaches a judgment; 
an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal only on a point of law, and the 
applicable principles are those of traditional judicial review.402  If a further 
application is lodged to Strasbourg, the ECtHR will examine the entire 
factual matrix in a similar manner to SIAC.403  There is much to be said for 
entrusting the initial task to a highly specialized tribunal, notwithstanding 
the fact that an applicant is denied a meaningful reassessment of the factual 
situation pending a determination by Strasbourg.404  It does, however, 
mean that any future attempts to limit ECtHR involvement in deportation 
cases should be closely scrutinized, since as a court of last instance, the 
U.K. Supreme Court will be concerned only with questions of law.405 
Despite the fact that SIAC provides detailed scrutiny of key issues, 
criticisms levied at the Commission have been aimed at its deference to 
executive decision-making.406  SIAC has rejected submissions on behalf of 
the Secretary of State that it was ³poorly equipped to review the 
assessments and decisions´ in the field of international relations.407  
Instead, the Commission has consistently held that it is for SIAC to decide 
KRZ PXFK ZHLJKW WR JLYH WR WKH 6HFUHWDU\ RI 6WDWH¶s determination, 
forming its view from all of the available evidence:408   
 
 
[T]he Commission has not adopted a deferential approach, 
treating the SSHD as having a constitutionally allocated 
IXQFWLRQRUUROHZKLFKUHTXLUHVXVWRGHIHUWRKLP«:HGR
not deny that the Security Service has an expertise which we 
                                                                                                                          
401
 Id. at [189]; Section 6 of the Human Rights Act, 1998, chapter 42.  
402
 See 5%Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8.+/>±73] (Lord Phillips).   
403
 Id. at [66] 4.1.  ³,t makes sense to reserve such a task to a specialist tribunal without providing 
for a full merits review by an appellate court. That does, of course, mean that decisions of SIAC may 
be reversed at Strasbourg, either because the ECtHR makes a different assessment of the relevant facts 
RU EHFDXVH DGGLWLRQDO UHOHYDQW IDFWV KDYH FRPH WR WKDW FRXUW¶V DWWHQWLRQ 7KLV LV D SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW
3DUOLDPHQWKDVFKRVHQWRDFFHSW´ 
404³7KHUHLVJRRGUHDVRQIRUWKLV7KHOHQJWKRI6,$&
VGHFLVLRQLQ4DWDGD
VFDVHDQGWKHWLPe that 
it took to deliver, evidences the size of the task that a rigorous scrutiny of the material facts in a case 
such as this can involve. It makes sense to reserve such a task to a specialist tribunal without providing 
for a full merits review by an appHOODWHFRXUW´Id. at [66] (Lord Phillips). See also the comments of 
/RUG +RIIPDQQ ³>7@KHUH LV QRWKLQJ LQ WKH &RQYHQWLRQ ZKLFK SUHYHQWV WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP IURP
according only a limited right of appeal, even if the issue involves a Convention right. There is no 
&RQYHQWLRQREOLJDWLRQWRKDYHDULJKWRIDSSHDODWDOO´Id. at [190] (Lord Hoffmann). 
405
 See 5%Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8.+/>±73] (Lord Phillips). 
406
 Metcalfe, supra note 350, at 77±79. 
407
 4DWDGDY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W[2007] SIAC SC/15/2005 [3]; Y Y6HF¶\RI6WDWH
IRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@6,$&6&>±26]. 
408
 Y Y6HF¶\RI6WDWH IRU WKH+RPH'HS¶W >@6,$&6& >±26]; Othman (Abu 
Qatada) v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, [2007] UKSIAC 15/2005 [324±26].  
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have to take into account but that is different from 
constitutional deference or respect for differently allocated 
roles.409 
 
6,$&¶VGHFLVLRQ regarding the insufficiency of Libyan assurances adds 
IXUWKHU FUHGHQFH WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DVVHUWLRns that SIAC, given its 
expertise, is suitably independent and capable of subjecting assurances to 
the appropriate degree of scrutiny.410  The role of SIAC has been 
vindicated by successive decisions of the ECtHR.411 
A tribunal endowed with the appropriate powers of review, such as 
SIAC, is an essential prerequisite to the formation of an effective DWA 
regime, particularly insofar as it encourages and assesses compliance with 
assurances.  This is not to suggest, however, that assurances do not still 
pose problems.  To do so would ignore NGO criticisms and two significant 
indicators that demonstrate the potential fallibility of assurances: cases in 
which assurances have been breached and the subsequent impotence of the 
States in which breaches have occurred.412  
C. There Are Examples of Non-Compliance and Impotency if Assurances 
are Broken 
NGOs and other institutions have repeatedly stressed reports of 
instances where assurances have been reneged upon.413  In a recent report, 
Amnesty International documented several such instances, including 
returns from Italy to Tunisia, Spain to Russia, as well as the notorious 
Sweden to Egypt return.414  Noll conducts a detailed analysis of the 
Swedish-Egyptian assurances which were breached, and concludes that in 
the aide-memoirs that were passed between Sweden and Egypt, Sweden 
deferred WR (J\SW¶V UHDGLQJ RI KXPDQ ULJKWV SULQFLSOHV415 rather than 
insisting on internationally approved norms. 
The existence of such breaches may serve as an affirmation of the 
                                                                                                                          
409
 <	$QRUY6HF¶\ RI6WDWHIRU WKH+RPH'HS¶W >@8.6,$& 36/2005 [59]; Qatada v. 
6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8.6,$&>±26]. 
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 K. Jones, supra QRWH  DW   1RWH WKDW WKLV LV QRW ZLWKRXW FULWLFLVP  ³$ VXSHUILFLDO
FRQVLGHUDWLRQRI6,$&¶VMXGJPHQWVPLJKWOHDGRQHWRFRQFOXGHWKDWLWVUHMHFWLRQRIWKH/LE\DQ028
was proof of the overall reasonableness of its approach.  Nothing could be further from the truth. The 
fact that even SIAC found a promise from Colonel Gadaffi too weak an assurance against torture is 
proof only that its members are not entirely bereft of reason, not that their judgment is therefore to be 
FRPPHQGHG´0HWFDOIHsupra note 350, at 82±83. 
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 Case of A. and Others v. U.K., HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012); Case of 
Othman (Abu Qatada) v. U.K., HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
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 Liberty & JUSTICE, supra note 237, ¶ 16. 
413
 Id. 
414
 Amnest\,QW¶Osupra note 296, at 6. 
415
 Noll, supra note 329, at 107±112. 
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observations above in relation to the nature of the bilateral agreement.416  
Assurances may work where there is such an arrangement, but the sending 
State must be careful not to acquiesce to unreasonable demands of the 
receiving State, particularly where that means deferring to the receiving 
6WDWH¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH VFRSH RI &$7 SURWHFWLRQ417  Various States 
took measures by which to limit the standard of protection against torture 
under CAT to that found in their own constitutions.418  It has already been 
suggested that care must be taken to ensure consistent interpretation of the 
obligation.419  Much will again depend on the nature of the bilateral 
relationship.  The United Kingdom has required compliance from receiving 
States in terms of the U.K.¶VREOLJDWLRQVIORZLQJIURPERWK(XURSHDQDQG
international lDZ GHVSLWH $PQHVW\¶V UHSRUW criticizing both the U.K. 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V':$SROLFy.420 
Even where a breach is suspected, it has been suggested that the 
deporting State may be powerless to take action.421  The Director of 
Central Intelligence notoriously summarized this in 2005, stating to 
Congress: 
 
We have a responsibility of trying to ensure that they are 
properly treated, and we try and do the best we can to 
JXDUDQWHHWKDW%XWRIFRXUVHRQFHWKH\¶UHRut of our control, 
WKHUH¶VRQO\VRPXFKZHFDQGR422 
 
The evident concern with such a policy has been echoed by NGOs.423  
                                                                                                                          
416
 In respect of the Jordanian assurances, see, e.g.4DWDGDY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W
>@8.6,$&>@VWDWLQJ³,QUHDFKLQJWKLVDUUDQJHPHQWZLWKWKH*RYHUQPHQWRIJordan, 
the UK Government had taken into consideration the long tradition of friendly relations between the 
WZRFRXQWULHV,WEHOLHYHGWKDWSODFLQJWKHDJUHHPHQWLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHFRXQWULHV¶ELODWHUDOUHODWLRQV
reinforced the commitment of both parties WRUHVSHFWLW´see also id., at [280], [478], [495±96], [508] 
VWDWLQJ ³)RU RXU SDUW ZH KDYH VRPH GLIILFXOW\ LQ VHHLQJ ZK\    LW >LV@ XQFOHDU ZK\ D ELODWHUDO
agreement in the form of an MOU would be adhered to, where a multilateral human rights agreement 
with reporting arrangements has been breached. The answer here . . . is precisely that it is bilateral, and 
is the result of a longstanding and friendly relationship in which there are incentives on both sides to 
comply once the agreement was signeG´ 
417
 Noll, supra note 329, at 107±112. 
418
 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
G.A. Res 39/46, Art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).  The U.S. in particular lists such a 
reservation.  Id. 
419
 See Noll, supra note 329, at 107±112.  
420
 See $PQHVW\,QW¶Osupra note 296, at 30. 
421
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra  note 7, at 26±27.  
         
422
 Id. at 37 (citing testimony of Porter J. Goss, Director, Central Intelligence, quoted in Douglas 
Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad to Jails, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 6, 2005, http://www.nytimes/com/2005/03/06/politics/06intel.html). 
423
  $PQHVW\,QW¶Osupra note 237, at 9±10. 
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The obvious response to such criticism lies in the nature of the bilateral 
agreement.424  A carefully implemented DWA strategy, firmly entrenched 
in a bilateral relationship between States, is very different to that adopted 
in this statement, and it is also very different, as the SIAC analysis makes 
clear,425 from the attitudes of the Swedish and Egyptian Governments in 
Agiza v. Sweden.426  It may be impossible for sending States to divulge the 
exact nature of the political or other sanctions that may be imposed should 
a receiving State renege on its assurances.  That does not preclude the 
possibility that an appropriate tribunal may provide adequate scrutiny, as 
SIAC has proven.427 
A breach of assurance in the past should not preclude the possibility of 
effective and reliable assurances being promulgated in the future.  If one 
assurance is flawed, it does not necessarily follow that all assurances are 
flawed, since, as the courts have repeatedly stressed,428 each case will turn 
on its own particular facts, and each assurance needs to be assessed on its 
independent merits on the basis of the entire factual matrix.  What is 
instead needed here is for lessons to be learned from those alleged cases in 
which assurances have been reneged upon.429  It is clear from the SIAC 
jurisprudence in the United Kingdom that this has been a prime concern.  It 
should be possible to distill ways in which, with improved guidance430 and 
procedure, future violations can be prevented.  It is therefore suggested that 
this criticism does not provide substantial grounds for considering 
assurances to be incapable of satisfying obligations under CAT.431  
                                                                                                                          
424
 In respect of the Jordanian assurances, see, e.g., Qatada v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, 
[2007] UKSIAC 15/2005 >@VWDWLQJ³,QUHDFKLQJWKLVDUUDQJHPHQWZLWKWKH*RYHUQPHQWRI-RUGDQ
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UHLQIRUFHGWKHFRPPLWPHQWRIERWKSDUWLHVWRUHVSHFWLW´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is the result of a longstanding and friendly relationship in which there are incentives on both sides to 
FRPSO\RQFHWKHDJUHHPHQWZDVVLJQHG´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 See Qatada v. Sec'y of State for Home Dep't, [2007] UKSIAC 15/2005 [496]. 
426
 See Supp. No. 44 A/60/44; supra note 253, at 231 n.q. 
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 See, e.g.99Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8.6,$&>@ 
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 Saadi v. Italy, HUDOC, http://echr.coe.int (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
429
 Note, U.N. Refugee Agency, Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee Protection, 
U.N.H.C.R. Note (Aug. 2006) at ¶ 22.  
430
 K. Jones, supra note 27, at 193. 
431
  JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
TERRORISM BILL AND RELATED MATTERS, 2005-06, H.L. 75-I, H.C. 561-I, ¶ 142 (U.K.). 
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D.  /RUG 3KLOOLS¶V &DWFK-22:432 If You Need to Ask for Assurances, You 
Cannot Rely on Them 
The UN Special Rapporteur has stated that ³the very fact that such 
diplomatic assurances are sought is an acknowledgement that the requested 
State, in the opinion of the requesting State, is practicing torture´433  As 
long as a DWA regime of some sort is pursued, this criticism is unlikely to 
abate.  It is difficult to deny the logic of the conundrum: why should a 
State, which has previously breached legally enforceable international 
obligations surrounding torture, suddenly honor a non legally-binding 
political promise?  Lord Phillips has made a similar observation, stating 
that there is an: 
 
[A]bundance of material that supports the proposition that 
assurances should be treated with scepticism if they are given 
by a country where inhuman treatment by State agents is 
endemic.434  
 
This criticism directly correlates to the contention that assurances 
damage existing multilateral rights protection,435 a notion reinforced by the 
Rapporteur.  Rather than using diplomatic and legal powers to hold 
offending States to account for their violations, a requesting State through 
an assurance seeks only an exception for the practice of torture for a few 
individuals.436  This leads to double standards.437  The UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has likewise raised this argument438 but 
the inverse, that assurances actually weaken individual human rights 
protection, has similarly been made.439 
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 RB (Alg.) (FC) & anoWKHUY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>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protecting human rights. Or, one may add, to the coherenFHRI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´1ROO supra note 
329, at 115. 
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 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 16±17. 
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 Id. at 23±VWDWLQJ³,IWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DVDZKROHZHUHWRHQGRUVHDVVXUDQFHVWR
protect one person, it would be perceived as ignoring those systematic failings, neglecting the 
obligation to address the endemic nature of the problem, and providing abusive governments with a 
device to falsely flaunt their human rights credentials without having to abide by their general legal 
obligations on WRUWXUH´ 
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 U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement before the Council of Europe Group of 
Specialists on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism, ¶ 3,  (Mar. 29±31, 2006). 
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 In the context of Agiza v. Sweden, it has been suggested that the assurances at play fell short of 
those required by CAT.  Noll, supra note 329, at 108±12. 
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Against this backdrop of criticism, it has been argued on behalf of the 
U.K. government that the existence of bilateral agreements actually serve 
to strengthen the multilateral rights framework.440  Bilateral agreements 
that have been in place and subject to judicial scrutiny in the United 
Kingdom may well have caused further scrutiny RI WKH UHFHLYLQJ 6WDWHV¶
compliance with multinational rights norms.441  It is possible to identify 
States that have substantially improved their reputation, despite prior 
firmly entrenched notoriety for breaching their international obligations. 442  
It would be impossible for a State with a notable reputation for violating its 
obligations under CAT to suddenly accede to international pressure, 
renounce its old ways, and ratify OPCAT.  Interim diplomacy is vital, and 
the U.K. experience with the Algerian authorities has shown that long-term 
international compliance may follow once bilateral obligations have been 
successfully negotiated. 443 
E.  It Is Not in the Interests of Either Party to the Assurance to Report a 
Breach 
One of the central difficulties with the implementation and monitoring 
of assurance lies in the fact that secrecy is paramount.  Noll observes a 
³double secret´ which conceals each source of terror on behalf of both the 
individual and the State commenting that assurances negatively 
circumscribe this fear since details cannot be released for security 
reasons.444  It is argued that a breach of an assurance cannot be articulated 
as a human rights violation since this would jeopardize the position of the 
State.445  Indeed, it could be stated that it is in the interests of neither party 
to an assurance to find a breach.  The State seeks to avoid a breach for both 
political and security reasons, as well as its international law obligations.446  
A body monitoring the use of assurances may be under pressure by virtue 
of the relationship between the monitoring agency and the sending and 
receiving countries, since continued access to deportees will require 
ongoing compliance and dialogue.447  A receiving State obviously does not 
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wish to have their assurance brought into disrepute, particularly where it 
involves negotiations undertaken at the highest level of government, and 
likewise has international obligations and politics to consider.448  Finally, 
the deportee himself may not wish to draw attention to any mistreatment 
for fear of secret repercussions and further abuse.449  Similar criticisms 
have been provided by the UN Special Rapporteur450 and were voiced by 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: 
 
[S]hort of very intrusive and sophisticated monitoring 
measures, such as around-the-clock video surveillance of the 
deportee, there is little oversight that could guarantee that the 
risk of torture will be obliterated in any particular case. 
While detainees as a group may denounce their torturers if 
interviewed privately and anonymously, a single individual is 
unlikely to reveal his ill-treatment if he is to remain under the 
control of his tormentors after the departure of the 
³PRQLWRUV´451 
 
Allied to this is the concern that specific forms of ill-treatment and 
torture may not leave physical marks and therefore may be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to detect. This issue was highlighted by SIAC 
in Qatada.452 
-RQHV¶ response to these arguments is that steps are taken for 
independent monitoring, ensuring that ill-treatment should not be kept 
secret once a deportee was returned.453  It has been disingenuously argued 
that it is not in the U.K.¶VLQWHUHVWIRUEUHDFKHVRIDVVXUDQFHVWREHKLGGHQ
since it is U.K. policy not to deport where there is a real risk of ill-
treatment;454 this argument is at odds with the U.K.¶VDJJUHVVLYHSURPRWLRQ
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of DWA generally.455  Secrecy remains a prevailing concern regarding 
breaches of the CAT obligation, but through independent monitoring and 
wider international cooperation, this should not represent an 
insurmountable hurdle for a rights-compliant DWA regime to overcome.  
By importing effective monitoring mechanisms, the risk of torture or ill-
treatment may be brought below the requisite threshold to comply with the 
non-refoulement obligation.456  Black-letter assurances (a priori MOUs) 
offer only one side to a multifaceted DWA regime; compliance with such 
assurances relies not only on the black letter of the agreement but also on 
the associated political will, verbal agreements, and trust between the 
parties.  
Championing international law as the sole arbiter in non-refoulement 
instances leads to problems with regard to enforceability and State 
compliance.457  What is needed is a twin-track approach, the establishment 
LQ6WDWHV¶GRPHVWLFODZRIDFOHDUUREXVW, and justiciable DWA framework, 
together with a more robust international stance, to allow for greater 
enforcement, independence, and sanctions for breach.   
F.  Monitoring is Ineffective: 
A recent JURISTS report concludes that:  
 
[I]QSULQFLSOHDQGSUDFWLFH«WKHUHDUHVHULRXVSUREOHPVZLWK
diplomatic assurances. In principle, reliance on diplomatic 
assurances is wrongly being used as a way of ³delegating´ 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\ « WR WKH UHFHLYLQJ country alone. That 
undermines the truly international nature of the duty to 
prevent and prohibit torture.458  
 
In answer to such criticisms, Jones mounts a robust defense of the 
system of assurances adopted by the U.K. government,459 stating that the 
differing approaches taken by the government and SIAC illustrate that each 
assurance is objectively assessed for reliability and that the government 
does believe that the governments who have provided it with assurances 
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will comply with them.460  It should be noted WKDW PDQ\ RI -RQHV¶
arguments are predicated and reliant on the rigor and independence of a 
monitoring body following removal despite the fact that a monitoring body 
is not an essential prerequisite.461  The foregoing criticisms have also 
highlighted the need for independent monitoring in a rights-compliant 
DWA regime; there is a need for international cooperation and discussion 
as to how consistent monitoring may be implemented. 
1.  A Mandatory Independent Monitoring Mechanism 
OPCAT was designed to facilitate inspections so as to prevent 
violations of CAT.462  The relevant provisions of OPCAT are found in Part 
IV and inter alia allow for independent monitoring through the 
establishment of ³national preventive mechanisms.´  Under Article 23, 
parties to the Convention undertake to publish annual reports of such 
mechanisms.463  The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated 
that countries cannot give credible assurances if they have not accepted 
independent monitoring under OPCAT.464  It is certainly true that this will 
be one factor for consideration when making an assessment as to an 
DVVXUDQFH¶VUHOLDELOLW\ The reality, however, is that there are many States 
that have not ratified OPCAT,465 and the very States to which a sending 
country may wish to deport are invariably not parties to it.466  In theory, of 
course it is desirable that an individual should not be deported to a State 
that has not ratified OPCAT.  In reality, this has not been the case; 
adopting the stance supported by the High Commissioner would preclude 
deportation to each of the States with which assurances have been 
developed and upheld by the courts.467  
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Nonetheless, the requirement for monitoring has been widely accepted. 
The UN Rapporteur has stressed the need for prompt, regular, independent 
monitoring, together with private interviews in order to ensure that the 
assurance is complied with and that there is no resulting ill-treatment.468  
Monitoring by competent and independent personnel appears to be a 
requirement realized by the Committee Against Torture.469  
The practice of the United Kingdom has not been entirely consistent 
with this guidance.  SIAC and the (then) House of Lords have stopped 
short of requiring monitoring per se, instead requiring only that effective 
verification should take place; monitoring merely provides one means of 
achieving this aim.470  Other courts, including the ECtHR, have stressed the 
importance of monitoring,471 but there remains no developed legal practice 
as to minimum requirements for monitoring provisions.472  The U.K.¶V
assurances with Algeria, Jordan, and Libya provide some pertinent 
illustrations here.  
Independence of the monitoring body is an essential requirement,473 
and it is generally accepted that the more independent the monitoring body, 
the stronger the assurance will be.  First, compliance with transparent 
monitoring mechanisms would act as a more effective deterrent against ill-
treatment to the receiving State.474  Second, potential ill-treatment 
following return may be more likely to be uncovered by an independent 
team of expertly-trained investigators.475  While the foregoing concerns 
regarding secrecy and transparency remains applicable, such monitoring 
may go some way to assuage these considerations.476  This reasoning 
resonates with the attitude of the U.K. government.477 
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 Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, transmitted by note by the Secretary-General, Report 
submitted pursuant to G. A. Res. 58/164, ¶ 42, UN Doc. A/59/324 (Sept. 1, 2004). 
469
 Supp. No. 44 A/60/44, supra  note 253, ¶ 13.8 (2005); Report of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, UN 
Commission on Human Rights, ¶ 30, U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/2006/94, (Feb. 16, 2006). 
470
 Lord Phillips, citiQJWKHWHVWDGRSWHGE\0LWWLQJ-LQ6,$&5%Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH
'HS¶W>@8.+/>@(QJ 
471
 See Supp. No. 44 A/60/44, supra note 339, ¶ 13.8 (2005). 
472
 Larsaeus, supra note 312, at 18. 
473
 See SDUWLFXODUO\''DQG$6Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRU WKH+RPH'HS¶W >@8.6,$&DQG
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 Larsaeus, supra note 312, at 18. 
475
 Id. at 18±19. 
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The U.K.¶VDVVXUDQFHVIURP$OJHULDDUHQRWpredicated on the basis of 
full MOU and, indeed, there is no provision for independent monitoring,478 
yet both the SIAC and the House of Lords have upheld these.479  Other 
arrangements made by the United Kingdom have used local organizations 
for monitoring; indeed this represents a key strand of the U.K. 
goYHUQPHQW¶V VWUDWHJ\ RI enhanced assurances.480  From this perspective, 
one of the key criticisms levied at the United Kingdom relates to the 
monitoring of the MOU between the United Kingdom and Jordan, since it 
relies on a local human rights charity acting without statutory mandate.481  
Nonetheless, the ECtHR scrutinized the monitoring arrangements in place, 
and it is clear that whilst the charity ³does not have the same expertise or 
resources as leading international NGOs such as Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch or the International Committee of the Red Cross´482 
it nonetheless was capable of verifying compliance with the assurances, 
was independent of the government, and its limitations had been 
realistically appraised by SIAC.483  Conversely, the Libyan MOU was held 
to be insufficient by SIAC and the Court of Appeal, not least because the 
³independent´ monitoring body was headed by the son of Colonel Gaddafi, 
allegations of ill-treatment in Libya were commonplace, and Gaddafi 
himself was known to be unpredictable; there was a real risk the assurance 
could be reneged upon at a later date.484  
It is contended that the U.K. FRXUWV¶ UHTXLUHPHQW IRU ³[e]ffective 
verification´ of an assurance falls far short of the standard required of such 
a regime, even though it satisfied the House of Lords.485  This has the 
consequence of perhaps undermining the sufficiency of the Algerian 
assurances, despite the fact that SIAC has accepted that there is a 
³FRQWLQXXP RI GHYHORSLQJ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ«EHWZHHQ WKH WZR FRXQWULHV´486 
and that SIAC appears to be suggesting that these agreements in principle 
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are sufficiently robust.487  6WUDVERXUJ¶V UXOLQJ that the Qatada assurances 
amounted to a partial vindication of the U.K. JRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\, but the 
situation may have been very different had independent monitoring 
arrangements not been in existence.488  
A strong case can be made for mandatory independent post-return 
monitoring in order to comply with the non-refoulement obligation. 
Amnesty International rejects this contention, stating that ³sporadic 
monitoring alone cannot eliminate the risk of torture or other ill-treatment 
that a particular person would otherwise face - and no reputable 
independent monitoring body has ever made that claim.´489  It is 
acknowledged that even the best monitoring mechanisms does not provide 
adequate safeguards against torture.490  As the NGO has stated:  
 
[A]d hoc monitoring schemes necessarily omit the broader 
institutional, legal, and political elements that can make 
certain forms of system-wide monitoring of all places of 
detention (and therefore all detainees) in a country one way, 
in combination with other measures, of potentially reducing 
the country-wide incidence of ill-treatment over the long-
term.491 
 
It has already been seen above that the non-refoulement obligation is 
not absolute; a degree of risk of ill-treatment remains permissible.492  The 
approach of SIAC has been to require only that independent monitoring 
should ensure that there is no real risk of ill-treatment,493 even in 
circumstances where an individual felt inhibited from speaking out about 
ill-treatment upon their return.494  It would be irrational to preclude the use 
of assurances in some form or another in order to reduce this risk of ill-
treatment to permissible levels.  
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As to the form that such international monitoring should take, eminent 
international NGOs, including the International Committee for the Red 
Cross, Amnesty International, or Human Rights Watch, may be best placed 
to act as an independent arbiter and monitor compliance with assurances 
following removal.495  The UK Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights has suggested a similar proposal.496  All of these organizations have 
already refused to serve in this function as a matter of course in DWAs,497 
seeing this as tacit affirmation as to the human rights compatibility of the 
assurance regime generally, rather than as a means of preventing future 
violations.498  It is unfortunate that such NGOs have chosen to maintain 
their principled opposition against the use of assurances, despite 
overwhelming evidence that assurances continue to be sought.499  
Opposition in theory is laudable but hardly pragmatic, particularly where 
further NGO involvement could offer a further valuable safeguard as part 
of a package of monitoring measures.  
OPCAT in its current form does not provide the degree of support 
required due to low ratification; international pressure should be brought to 
increase the number of States that have ratified the protocol.500  Facilitating 
assurances in the first instance requires a significant degree of diplomacy; 
there is no reason why such pressure and diplomacy, reciprocated at an 
international level, cannot result in a higher ratification rate of OPCAT.  
The U.K.¶V H[SHULHQFH ZLWK WKH $OJHULDQ ':$ SURYLGHV VXFK DQ
illustration; Algeria refused to acquiesce to demands for independent 
monitoring, perceiving it as an encroachment on its national sovereignty.501  
Yet the political importance of the U.K.-Algerian relationship was 
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examined by SIAC, and ³top-level green light´ for the ratification of 
OPCAT by the Algerian authorities was said to exist, pursuant to the 
appropriate mechanisms being in place.502  
The longevity of the post-return monitoring obligation may give cause 
for concern. The risk to a deportee is greatest immediately following their 
return;503 it is unrealistic to expect a sending State to ensure monitoring 
occurs for the lifetime of the concerned individual.  In Ben Khemais v 
Italy,504 the court held a diplomatic assurance insufficient to comply with 
the demands of Article 3 ECHR, since there was no reliable system of 
accountability for torture in Tunisia, the receiving State, and there had 
been difficulties in accessing detainees in Tunisian prisons.505  This was 
notwithstanding the fact that the deportee in that case had not complained 
of ill-treatment following his return; the court held the assurance 
insufficient due to the inability to verify or challenge the situation as it 
developed in the future.506  It should be noted that a three-year post-return 
monitoring deadline was set in the MOU between the United Kingdom and 
Jordan, and this assurance was upheld by the House of Lords and the 
ECtHR.507  Crucially, Strasbourg held that subsequent diplomatic notes had 
made clear that monitoring would potentially continue indefinitely while 
the deportee was in detention, provided that detention began within the 
first three years of return.508  SIAC has observed that it cannot be 
concerned with long-term political speculation and that it must evaluate 
conditions over the medium term.509  Nonetheless, it appears inevitable that 
future assurances will incorporate lengthy periods of post-return 
monitoring if they are to be upheld.510  The imposition of a lifetime 
monitoring requirement would pose an unacceptable, if not 
insurmountable, burden on returning States, but it would appear sensible to 
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create a link between detention upon return and the temporal duration of a 
monitoring requirement. 
A further criticism relates to the lack of post-return remedies511 once an 
assurance is breached.  Diplomatic sanctions may provide an appropriate 
response at State level, but an individual who suffers refoulement should 
have an adequate remedy.  One suggestion has been to impose an 
obligation to return the deportee to the sending State where monitoring 
reveals an indication of human rights violations.512  This issue may be 
worthy of further exploration.  There are likely to be substantial practical 
difficulties with such an approach, not least of which is the additional 
credence given to the criticisms around secrecy in a DWA regime.  It is not 
difficult to see why a sending State may be reticent to acknowledge the 
breach of an assurance if it means that it then faces the return of a known 
terrorist onto home soil.  
V.  CONCLUSIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE ASSURANCES 
The use of assurances has proven to be a cornerstone of the new 
counter-terrorism policies of Anglo-American governments and beyond.  
The terrorism threat is an international phenomenon and individual 
countries must take responsibility for augmenting their counter-terrorism 
arsenal both at home and abroad.  A more consistent international approach 
could be taken viz non-refoulement, assurances and the prohibition on 
torture and ill-treatment generally.513  This article has shown that the 
United States and the United Kingdom interpret their international law 
obligations in this area very differently.  
It is contended that there is no consistent principle of international law 
that prohibits the use of assurances in removal cases; any criticisms that 
continue to be directed towards a DWA regime are eminently 
surmountable.514  Assurances can be used in order to bring the risk of ill-
treatment to below a threshold level.  There is evidence that the 
development of sound bilateral agreements serve to strengthen multilateral 
rights protection.515   Although the U.K.¶VUHVSRQVHLVIDUIURPSHUIHFWWKH
expert scrutiny of SIAC is clearly preferable to the U.S. practice of reliance 
on executive determinations.  This article has identified areas in which 
improvements are possible, whilst at the same time recognizing the 
pragmatic reality of the threat faced by States in the War on Terrorism.  
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A.  Towards a Domestic DWA Policy 
States should establish in their domestic law a clear, robust, and 
justiciable DWA framework, building on principles of international law.  
This framework has tripartite foundations: there is a need for justiciability, 
effective compliance, and independent monitoring of assurances. 
Codifying removal procedures in statute would allow for initial and 
continuing scrutiny by the legislative branch.  In the United Kingdom, such 
a policy could lead to greater transparency through expanding the role of 
the ³Independent Reviewer´ of Terrorism legislation.516  Parliamentary 
Committees, including the influential Joint Committee on Human Rights, 
would scrutinize and supervise the operation of the regime. 
In terms of justiciability, the judiciary should play a central role in 
ensuring oversight of executive-based removal strategies.  The use of a 
highly specialized tribunal, such as SIAC, has been key to the success of 
the DWA regime in the United Kingdom, but the United States has yet to 
implement an appropriate oversight mechanism.517  A suitable starting 
point for such a tribunal may be the four yardsticks adopted by SIAC, 
subsequently upheld upon appeal to the House of Lords:518  
 
1. the terms of the assurances have to be such that, if they are 
fulfilled, the person returned would not be subjected to [ill 
WUHDWPHQWRUWRUWXUH@« 
2. the assurances have to be given in good faith; 
3. there has to be a sound objective basis for believing that the 
assurances will be fulfilled; 
4. fulfillment of the assurances has to be capable of being verified.519 
As SIAC suggested, the first two of these requirements are axiomatic, 
but the subsequent comments of Lord Phillips, accepting the judgment of 
SIAC in the House of Lords, are of considerable importance: 
 
The third (test) require[s] a settled political will to fulfil [sic] 
the assurances allied to an objective national interest in doing 
so. It also require[s] the state to be able to exercise an 
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adequate degree of control over its agencies, including its 
security services, so that it would be in a position to make 
good its assurances.  As to verification, this could be 
achieved by a number of means, both formal and informal, of 
which monitoring [is] only one.  Effective verification [is], 
however, an essential requirement.520 
 
The terminology of fulfillment here is consistent with the conclusions 
of this article; enforcement is not so much an essential prerequisite as 
effective compliance.  Many considerations are relevant to such 
compliance and would be suited to incorporation within a Code of Practice, 
or set of guidelines, in order to provide transparent guidance as to the 
operation of a DWA regime.521  In this way, the considerable experience 
amassed through the work of the U.K.¶V )RUHLJQ DQG &RPPRQZHDOWK
Office, SIAC, and judgments of the appellate courts could be harnessed to 
inform developments to the regime.  The executive practices of the United 
States, if more openly discussed and examined, may also have a marked 
impact on the formulation and enhancement of new assurances. 
,QWHJUDO WR /RUG 3KLOOLSV¶ IRXUWK FULWHULRQ LV WKH QHHG WR HQVXUH WKDW
assurances are not entirely propagated in secret.522  Respectfully, it is 
argued that this requirement does not go far enough.  The House of 
Lords,523 Court of Appeal,524 and ECtHR525 have all indicated that 
independent monitoring is an important, but not essential, prerequisite for 
the current development of assurances.  It nonetheless would be sensible 
for States to adopt a system of monitoring as a minimum threshold for all 
assurances, given the uncertainty around their use526 and the robust judicial 
scrutiny to which all such arrangements should be subjected.   
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 Id. at [23]. 
521
 See supra text accompanying notes 238±42; White House, supra note 17, at 242; Id.  
522
 See the (probably obiter) remarks in RB Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W, [2009] UKHL 
10, [102]. (Lord Philips); this was applied at in Naseer et. al Y6HF¶\RI6WDWH IRU WKH+RPH'HS¶W
[2010] SIAC, SC/77/80/81/82/83/09, [36].  
523
 5%Y6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@8.+/>@ 
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 The Court of Appeal has recently denied that there is a rule of law that requires post-return 
monitoring: MS $OJHULDY6HF¶\RI6WDWHIRUWKH+RPH'HS¶W>@(:&$&LY>@ 
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 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. U.K., [2012], HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Oct. 28, 
2012). 
526
 6WUDVERXUJKDVFRQILUPHGWKDWZKDWLVUHTXLUHGLVDQDVVHVVPHQWRI³ZKHWKHUFRPSOLDQFHZLWK
the assurances can be objectively verified through diplomatic or other monitoring mechanisms, 
LQFOXGLQJSURYLGLQJXQIHWWHUHGDFFHVVWRWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VODZ\HUV´Id.  But the Jordanian assurances rest 
in part upon the use of an independent organization (the Adaleh Centre for Human Rights Studies) to 
monitor and report on the treatment of deportees and compliance with assurances generally. The door is 
therefore left open to further challenges, inter alia where such independent monitoring mechanisms are 
not in place. 
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Mandatory independent post-return monitoring should operate in 
conjunction with any other operable verification measures.  Imposing such 
a requirement will help to assuage many of the various criticisms that have 
been levied against assurances generally, particularly those in relation to 
compliance and secrecy.  The refusal of international NGOs to partake in 
such independent monitoring is disappointing; in developing a DWA 
regime, States should consider the possibility of using suitable smaller 
independent NGOs, which may report directly to the Committee Against 
Torture and the receiving State.  Over time it is possible that larger NGOs 
will follow suit.  It is equally possible that smaller NGOs will expand their 
scope and remit with the appropriate funding and support.527 
CAT provides a valuable multilateral rights framework, but it is 
regrettable that some signatories have registered reservations that are 
designed to limit the scope of its protection.  These reservations should be 
revisited and further international dialogue is required if the non-
refoulement obligation is to be permitted to attain the status of jus cogens. 
Increased ratification of OPCAT, with commensurate requirements for 
reporting and monitoring, would be a laudable goal; the development of a 
DWA regime with States may provide an important intermediary step on 
the path to full OPCAT compliance.  In this way, the pursuit of assurances 
can strengthen international cooperation, promote human rights and act as 
a lodestar for adherence to the rule of law beyond our borders.  Such 
principles are the very antithesis of the terrorist ideologies with which we 
are fighting, and few countries are better placed to champion this approach 
than the United States or the United Kingdom. 
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 This certainly appeared to be the case with the Jordanian monitoring body, as was observed by 
the ECtHR. Id. 
